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ABSTRACT 
Rachel B. Dolin: Drivers of Live Discharge from the Medicare Hospice Program:  
A Mixed Methods Study 
(Under the direction of Pam Silberman) 
The proportion of Medicare decedents accessing the hospice benefit at the end of life 
increased by more than 30 percentage points between 2000 and 2013. Yet the share of patients 
disenrolling from hospice prior to death has steadily increased over the last decade, representing 
nearly a fifth of all hospice discharges in 2012. Due to variations in the rate of live discharge at 
the hospice- and market-level, this outcome has come under scrutiny from policymakers, 
providers, and advocates as a potential indicator of poor quality. Such variations in live discharge 
rates and their documented association with hospice characteristics suggest that factors beyond 
patient choice may be driving these trends.  
The overall objective of this dissertation study was to better understand the factors 
driving live discharge from hospice. To explore this area of inquiry, I conducted three studies: 1) 
A qualitative study exploring provider perceptions of the factors driving live discharge from 
hospices (chapter 2), 2) a quantitative facility-level study analyzing the relationship between 
hospice margins and live discharge rates (chapter 3), and 3) an empirical work delving into the 
relationship between the timing of live discharges relative to the hospice aggregate cap (and each 
hospice’s respective risk of exceeding the cap at different points in the year) and the likelihood 
of an individual patient’s experiencing a live discharge (chapter 4).  
Overall, the results from these three studies together paint a complicated picture in which 
live discharges stem from not one primary driver but the confluence of many factors, arrayed in 
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a variety of ways, to produce each individual patient-level outcome. Although these three studies 
provide evidence for “gaming” in the hospice delivery system, such trends do not suggest that 
higher live discharge rates are automatically reflective of poor quality — and vice versa. The 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ought to, thus, exercise caution before proceeding 
with a live discharge claims-based quality indicator. More generally, the totality of this work 
suggests that the Medicare hospice program has serious issues that must be resolved through 
payment system reform, increased oversight, benefit redesign, or some combination thereof. 
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PROLOGUE 
 
“We can do much more to relieve suffering, respect personal dignity, and provide 
opportunities for people to find meaning in life’s conclusion.”  
— Institute of Medicine, Committee on Care at the End of Life, 1997 
 
When the U.S. Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, the 2,000-plus page 
bill excluded proposed legislation policymakers had introduced in 2009 to reimburse physicians 
for the time they spent counseling Medicare patients on end-of-life (EOL) care options 
(Zeytinoglu 2011). The nationwide debate over the suggested change in Medicare reimbursement 
— the so-called “death panels” — and the ultimate decision to omit this reimbursement change 
from the final bill capped off a decade of significant change in EOL care delivery, marked by 
notable expansion in the volume of hospice and palliative care providers on the one hand and 
misperceptions regarding the value of such services on the other.  
That decade of change began in 1997 when the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a 
landmark report on the EOL care delivery system, entitled Approaching Death: Improving Care 
at the End of Life (1997). The IOM Committee on Care at the End of Life catalogued the 
insufficiencies of the national, regional, and local services and supports available to individuals 
nearing the end of life and provided suggestions for improvement (1997). “We can do much 
more to relieve suffering, respect personal dignity, and provide opportunities for people to find 
meaning in life’s conclusion,” the report said (1997).  
Approaching Death heralded in an era of change: Between 2000 and 2012, Medicare 
hospice spending increased by more than 400 percent — from $2.9 billion in 2000 to $15.1
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billion in 2012 — and the number of hospice providers increased by 65 percent during that time 
(MedPAC March 2015). The rate of enrollment also kept pace with the boom in spending and 
provider availability: In 2013, 1.3 million Medicare beneficiaries received hospice services — a 
far cry from the 197,400 patients who had enrolled in services in 1992, 10 years after Congress 
had passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) to create the 
Medicare hospice program for terminally ill patients (Bernstein, Hing et al. 2003, MedPAC 
March 2015). 
Despite the increasing availability and visibility of hospice providers and palliative care 
programs, there is consensus that the U.S. health care system is still ill-equipped to provide the 
necessary services and supports to individuals nearing the end of life and, furthermore, that the 
payment mechanisms currently in place do not appropriately reflect the complexity of patient 
social, emotional, psychological, and physical needs at the end of life. At the same time that the 
public conversation about EOL care turned into an acrimonious debate about death panels, the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) released a report encouraging significant 
reforms to the Medicare hospice payment system, which the commission believed encouraged 
inappropriate profit-maximization behavior among some providers (MedPAC March 2009). In 
fact, a CMS Proposed Rule published in the Federal Register in May 2015 expressed these 
concerns in no uncertain terms: “We are concerned that some hospices are making 
determinations of hospice coverage based solely on cost and reimbursement as opposed to being 
based on patient-centered needs, preferences and goals for those approaching the end of life,” 
(CMS May 2015). Although the Medicare payment system has experienced a wave of reform 
since the passage of the ACA, it still largely resembles the per-diem hospice payment system the 
U.S. Congress put in place through TEFRA in 1983.  
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Concerns regarding the Medicare hospice program are reflective of larger issues in the 
EOL care delivery system: The need for services at the end of life has grown and, yet, the 
payment mechanisms to facilitate such services are either non-existent or products of an era that 
catered primarily to cancer patients. In the fall of 2014, the IOM released another report 
discussing the insufficiencies of a care delivery system oriented toward acute, curative 
treatments rather than palliative, comfort treatments. “At present, the U.S. health care system is 
ill designed to meet the needs of patients near the end of life and their families,” the IOM’s 
Committee on Approaching Death said in its report, Dying in America: Improving Quality and 
Honoring Individual Preferences Near the End of Life (2014). 
Although the Medicare hospice program is not the only mechanism for the delivery of 
palliative treatments for individuals with terminal illness, it is by far the most institutionalized, 
making it ripe for initial research and reform. Analyses that enhance our understanding of 
inappropriate or inadequate patterns of hospice use — inconsistent with patient preferences — 
may highlight priority areas for change that could ultimately ensure higher quality care is 
provided at the end of life. Accordingly, through a thorough literature review (Chapter 1) and a 
series of three related studies (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), this dissertation explores an outcome that, in 
some instances, may signal poor quality care: live discharge from hospice (also referred to as 
“live disenrollment” throughout this report). We define a “live discharge” as instances when a 
patient enrolls in hospice and then disenrolls — for various patient- or provider-initiated reasons 
— prior to death. Such patterns of hospice use are important to understand and explore in further 
depth because they may reflect larger issues in the EOL delivery system: fragmented care, 
potential lack of adherence to patient preferences at the end of life, and misaligned financial 
incentives. More nuanced understanding of issues such as these may provide additional evidence 
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for payment and delivery system reform, which, in turn, may begin to turn around a system in 
dire need of the type of change the IOM encouraged nearly two decades ago.
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CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND 
Review of the literature 
 
Overview of the Medicare hospice program 
 
Twenty years before Congress passed TEFRA, solidifying hospice as a staple of the 
Medicare program, Florence Wald, Dean of the Yale School of Nursing, invited Cicely Saunders 
to deliver a series of lectures cataloguing her innovative hospice work in the United Kingdom 
(Connor 2008). Saunders’s visit marked the beginning of the modern hospice movement, leading 
to the establishment of the United States’ first hospice in Branford, Connecticut, in 1973 (Connor 
2008). The early U.S. hospice movement of the 1970s emphasized home-based alternative care 
for terminally ill patients, delivered by a large number of volunteers — both lay and professional 
(Kelley and Meier 2014) (Connor 2008). National stakeholder meetings in the mid- to late 1970s 
cemented hospice’s presence in the health care delivery system, manifesting in the 1978 
establishment of the National Hospice Organization (which became the National Hospice and 
Palliative Care Organization in 1999) and paving the way for the development of a formal 
benefit package and payment mechanism under the Medicare program (Connor 2008). 
Hospice benefit design 
 
As conceived in 1982, the Medicare hospice program continues to provide palliative and 
support services for terminally ill individuals expected to live six months or fewer, as certified by 
two physicians (Aldridge Carlson, Barry et al. 2012, MedPAC October 2014). Eighty-four
percent of hospices enrollees in 2011 received services from the Medicare program, 1 
  6 
encompassing 87.9 percent of patient days that year (NHPCO 2012). The program requires 
beneficiaries to opt out of traditional services covered under Medicare, though they may still 
receive support for conditions unrelated to the terminal condition2 (Plotzke, Christian et al. May 
2014, CMS May 2015, MedPAC October 2014). Once the patient enrolls in the program, the 
Medicare Hospice Benefit (MHB) covers two 90-day periods followed by unlimited 60-day 
stints; the hospice medical director must certify the patient’s terminal condition at the end of 
each benefit period (Kutner, Meyer et al. 2004, MedPAC March 2015). Although these time-
limited restrictions do not result in an automatic discharge once hospice patients exceed the six-
month limit, they must continue to show persistent decline to continue to receive the MHB 
(LeSage, Borgert et al. 2014). Alternatively, enrollees have the option of revoking the benefit at 
any point in time to seek curative treatment therapies (Johnson, Kuchibhatla et al. 2008, 
MedPAC March 2015). 
Patients can receive hospice care in a range of service locations: their home, an assisted 
living facility, a nursing home, an inpatient hospital, an inpatient hospice facility, or other 
locations (Bogasky, Sheingold et al. 2014). As has been the case since the beginning of the 
Medicare hospice program, the largest proportion of Medicare beneficiaries receive care in their 
own homes; however, other settings of care have increased in popularity — particularly nursing 
homes, following the 1989 Omnibus Reconciliation Act, which reduced restrictions associated 
with receiving hospice care while in a nursing home (Stevenson and Bramson 2009). According 
to an analysis Bogasky, Sheingold et al. (2014) conducted using hospice claims from 2008 to 
                                                
1Other payers covering hospice use that year included: managed care or private insurance (7.7 percent), Medicaid 
(5.2 percent), uncompensated care (1.3 percent), self-pay (1.1 percent), and other (0.7 percent). 
 
2In Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, Medicare paid $694.1 million for Part A and Part B services and $347.1 million for Part 
D for patients receiving hospice care. In a recent Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector 
General report, it was found that some of these Part D claims should have been paid for by the hospices. 
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2011, 55 percent of all users received care at home during that time, followed by nursing homes 
(27 percent), inpatient hospices (16 percent), inpatient hospitals (11 percent), assisted living 
facilities (eight percent), and other sites (two percent) (Stevenson, Huskamp et al. 2007).3  
Upon admission to hospice, patients receive a plan of care — outlining the range and 
frequency of services to be provided — from a multidisciplinary team of providers, which must 
include a hospice nurse, social worker, and counselor (MedPAC March 2015). The MHB covers 
a range of services, including but not limited to: nursing care, physician services, home health 
and homemaker services, short-term hospice inpatient care, physical therapy, occupational 
therapy, speech therapy,4 drugs (for symptom control), medical equipment, and family 
bereavement services (MedPAC March 2015, MedPAC October 2014). And such services can be 
provided from a number of staff members participating in the hospice multidisciplinary care 
teams, including: physicians, nurses, social workers, therapists, spiritual counselors, home health 
aides, bereavement counselors, and volunteers (NHPCO 2012). 
Out-of-pockets costs are minimal under the program, as hospices can only charge up to 
five percent coinsurance for drugs delivered outside inpatient settings (though the coinsurance 
cannot exceed $5 per drug) (MedPAC October 2014). In 2012, daily average coinsurance across 
total hospice days was $1.51 (Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014). Beneficiaries enrolled in 
inpatient respite care are responsible for paying five percent of Medicare’s daily rate, although 
annual payments are capped at the Part A inpatient hospital deductible amount for the enrollment 
year ($1,216 in 2014) (MedPAC October 2014).  
                                                
3Typically, hospice agencies contract with nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and other institutional care 
providers to deliver palliative care related to the patient’s terminal illness; all other services (e.g., room/board and 
long-term services in a nursing home) are provided by the institutional setting. 
 
4Physical, occupational, and speech therapists assist patients with pain relief by working with clients on issues 
associated with sensory, motor, emotional, and cognitive decline. 
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Criticism and responses  
 
Although the MHB has remained consistent since the program began providing services 
in 1983, its design has come under criticism in recent years — particularly as beneficiaries 
continue to enroll in greater numbers. As early as 1997, the IOM noted that the restrictions 
associated with hospice eligibility may exclude “many [people] who might benefit from hospice 
services” (1997). Of specific concern is the six-month prognostic criterion, which some consider 
to be an arbitrary timeframe and, perhaps more importantly, difficult to forecast for many 
patients, particularly those with non-cancer diagnoses who may not experience a predictable 
decline (Kutner, Blake et al. 2002, Kelley and Meier 2014). Such eligibility restrictions often 
result in patients being referred to and enrolling in hospice too late, which frequently yields 
worse outcomes for patients and their families (Teno, Shu et al. 2007). Nearly one-third of 
hospice patients and family members interviewed for a survey conducted in West Texas said 
they would have preferred starting hospice earlier in the course of illness (Adams, Bader et al. 
2009). Similarly, 11.4 percent of family members surveyed by Teno, Shu et al. (2007) said their 
loved one received hospice services too late.  
In response to these restrictions, some hospices have enacted open-access enrollment 
policies, which enable them to enroll patients prior to their eligibility for the MHB (Aldridge 
Carlson, Barry et al. 2012). In such instances, hospices absorb the costs of care for patients until 
they enroll in the MHB — which, in some instances, can include chemotherapy and radiation 
treatments (Aldridge Carlson, Barry et al. 2012). Open access policies vary across hospices, with 
some having completely unrestricted policies and others putting in place some combination of 
restrictions, which can include: requiring that the patient has a caregiver at home or refusing 
admission to patients receiving chemotherapy, transfusions, tube feeding, palliative radiation, 
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etc. (Aldridge Carlson, Barry et al. 2012). According to a national survey of hospices conducted 
between 2008 and 2009, nearly one-third (29 percent) of hospices had an open-access enrollment 
policy, with large, non-profits located in the South Atlantic region more likely to enact these less 
restrictive enrollment procedures (Aldridge Carlson, Barry et al. 2012). On the other hand, 
hospices located in the Pacific and Mountain regions were more likely to have restrictive 
enrollment rules (Aldridge Carlson, Barry et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, the requirement that patients forgo conventional treatment options upon 
hospice enrollment has come under such debate that Section 3021 of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) mandated the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) launch the Medicare 
Care Choice Model demonstration, to test the effect of eliminating this requirement on the timing 
of enrollment/referral and the costs and quality of care delivered (CMS , MedPAC March 2015). 
Patterns of hospice use and care delivery 
 
Despite such perceived limitations in eligibility requirements, for patients who ultimately 
enroll, the MHB improves outcomes through its holistic approach to care delivery, managing 
physical, spiritual, social, and psychological symptoms; supporting caregivers; and reducing 
inpatient stays (Kutner, Blake et al. 2002, Kelley and Meier 2014). According to a study of 
hospice enrollees in the late 1990s and early 2000s, hospice beneficiaries lived an average of 29 
days longer than comparable non-enrolled Medicare beneficiaries (Connor, Pyenson et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, research has shown hospice reduces costs: Compared to a similar group of 
beneficiaries who do not use hospice during the last two months of life, those who enroll in 
hospice incur less Medicare spending (MedPAC March 2015). Between 1993 and 2003, 
Medicare on average spent $2309 less per hospice user compared to a similar comparison group 
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of non-enrollees5 (Taylor, Ostermann et al. 2007). Such general patterns of positive health-
related and cost outcomes may be good news for an industry that continues to grow: In 2013, 
47.3 percent of Medicare beneficiaries who died that year used hospice, marking an increase 
from the 46.7 percent who used it in 2012 (MedPAC March 2015). This uptick represented only 
a small shift in use for an industry that saw the number of hospice users double between 2000 
and 2012, however (MedPAC October 2014). 
Patient-level trends 
 
During that time, the hospice industry also experienced an increase in the diversity of the 
patient population accessing the benefit (Aldridge 2015). Overall, hospice users tend to be older, 
female, White, and urban-dwelling with a non-cancer diagnoses — but such a profile does not 
fully capture an industry increasingly in flux (MedPAC March 2015). Between 2000 and 2010, 
the number of 65-plus Medicare decedents who accessed the MHB increased from 15.9 percent 
to 32.3 percent, with the 85-plus population group experiencing the largest rate of growth, 
encompassing 46 percent of all users in 2010 (Aldridge 2015). The racial/ethnic makeup of 
hospice users remained relatively unchanged during that same period, however, with an 
overwhelming majority of White decedents (88 to 89 percent) accessing the benefit, compared to 
seven to eight percent of African Americans and one to two percent of Hispanic beneficiaries 
(Aldridge 2015). Regionally, the greatest growth in the number of users has come in the South 
Atlantic region — encompassing, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Washington, D.C. — while the New England region 
experienced the greatest rate of growth during that decade at 152 percent (Aldridge 2015).  
                                                
5The study accounted for selection bias (through propensity scores) and length of stay in hospice. 
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Perhaps the most notable change in patient-level characteristics among hospice enrollees 
during the 30-plus years of the program’s existence has been primary patient diagnoses. When 
Medicare began offering the MHB in 1983, an overwhelming majority of beneficiaries were 
cancer patients (May 2015). In 1992, cancer patients represented 75 percent of the hospice 
population and 58 percent in 2000 (Kutner, Meyer et al. 2004, Aldridge 2015). By 2013, 
however, 68 percent of hospice decedents had a non-cancer diagnosis (MedPAC March 2015). 
During fiscal year (FY) 2012, the top five principal diagnoses among hospice enrollees were: 
lung cancer (11 percent), congestive heart failure (CHF) (seven percent), debility unspecified 
(six percent), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (five percent), and Alzheimer’s Disease 
(five percent) (May 2015). From 2000 to 2010, the industry saw a 501 percent increase in 
beneficiaries with ill-defined conditions, leading to a regulatory change on Oct. 1, 2014, that 
prohibited hospices from including “debility” and “adult failure to thrive” as the principal 
hospice diagnoses on a claim (Aldridge 2015, May 2015). 
Provider-level trends  
 
Similar to the patient population, the profile of hospice providers has shifted dramatically 
over the last decade, marked, most notably, by the rise of the for-profit hospice. When Medicare 
started reimbursing for hospice care, it certified 40 hospices — and only 10 percent of them were 
for-profit (Thompson, Carlson et al. 2012). Now, the picture is much different: Between 2000 
and 2012, the number of agencies increased by 65 percent, with the proportion of individuals 
enrolled in for-profit hospices more than tripling (Aldridge 2015, MedPAC March 2015). During 
that same period, both the number of non-profit and government-owned hospices declined 
(Stevenson, Dalton et al. 2015). In 2013, 61 percent of the industry was for-profit, 33 percent 
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was non-profit, and five percent was government-owned — with the number of for-profit 
providers increasing by 9.6 percent in that year alone (MedPAC March 2015).  
The changing face of the hospice provider over the last decade-and-a-half can not only be 
attributed to the opening of new hospice agencies but also hospice closures and ownership 
changes (Thompson, Carlson et al. 2012). One-fifth of Medicare-certified hospices delivering 
care in 1999 had closed by 2009, while 44 percent had changed ownership (Thompson, Carlson 
et al. 2012). Such changes in the industry are notable, as, compared to non-profits, for-profit 
hospices tend to provide a smaller scope of services with a lower staff-to-patient ratio (Aldridge, 
Schlesinger et al. 2014). Furthermore, Gandhi (2012) found that for-profit hospices more often 
enroll non-cancer patients who are likely to have longer lengths of stay (see Notable patterns of 
use: Length of stay section below for more details on the implications of length of stay) and 
obtain referrals from long-term care facilities; in contrast, they less frequently receive referrals 
from physician practices. 
 Stevenson, Dalton et al. (2015) argue that such for-profit/non-profit distinctions are too 
broad to draw conclusions about hospice provider behavior in a meaningful way, as chain 
ownership and corporate behavior often drive care delivery practice patterns more so than mere 
for-profit or non-profit financing structure. The authors found that between 2000 and 2011, the 
proportion of chain-owned hospices — particularly in the for-profit sector — increased 
dramatically, from 19 percent of the market share in 2000 to 41 percent in 2011, accounting for 
the care of 45 percent of enrollees, compared to 26 percent in 2000 (Stevenson, Dalton et al. 
2015). More specifically, the market share of for-profit chains increased from 13 percent in 2000 
to 32 percent in 2011, while the market share of non-profit chains grew from five to nine percent 
during that same period (Stevenson, Dalton et al. 2015). The number of non-profit non-chains 
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remained relatively stable, as did the number of government-owned facilities; for-profit non-
chains increased in number from 379 to 917 (Stevenson, Dalton et al. 2015).  
Nearly all (91 percent) of for-profit chains operated in freestanding facilities in 2011 — a 
trend that extended to 85.4 percent of for-profit non-chains (Stevenson, Dalton et al. 2015). 
Overall, in 2013, 72 percent of hospices were freestanding, 14 percent were co-located in a 
hospital, 13 percent were home-health based, and less than one percent were located in a skilled 
nursing facility (SNF) (MedPAC March 2015). Between 2012 and 2013, hospital-based facilities 
declined by 2.6 percent, while freestanding and home health-based providers increased by 7.6 
and 2.2 percent, respectively (MedPAC March 2015). Such changes represented an even greater 
shift from just over a decade earlier in 1999, in which 40 percent of hospices were freestanding, 
34 percent were home health-affiliated, and 25 percent were associated with a hospital 
(Thompson, Carlson et al. 2012). 
During the decade of 2000 to 2010, the percentage of hospice users served by small 
hospices declined by 19 percent, while the group served by large hospices grew by 29 percent — 
a trend largely driven by the fact that for-profit chains represent a group of larger agencies than 
non-chains and non-profit chains (Stevenson, Dalton et al. 2015, MedPAC March 2015). Of the 
10 largest chains in 2011, only one was non-profit (Stevenson, Dalton et al. 2015). 
Geographically, the distribution of for-profit chains is concentrated in the South, where the 
percentage of hospice enrollees receiving care from these types of agencies was highest: 
Louisiana (61 percent), Delaware (61 percent), Alabama (56 percent), Georgia (55 percent), and 
Texas (55 percent) (Stevenson, Dalton et al. 2015).  
The boom in number of hospice providers has yielded improved geographic access to 
hospice providers — yet geographic variations in hospice supply persist. In 2008, the 
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Midwestern and Southwestern regions of the United States had the smallest supply of hospices, 
while the two coasts – east of the Mississippi River and west of the Rocky Mountains had the 
greatest supply (Silveira, Connor et al. 2011). There were an average of 24.3 hospice agencies 
per county that year, with 26 counties having no hospice services (Silveira, Connor et al. 2011). 
According to a multivariate analysis Silveira, Connor et al. (2011) conducted, predictors of high 
hospice supply in 2008 included: county population size, wealth (median household income), 
race (proportion of African American residents), and age (proportion over 65 years). Still, a 2015 
MedPAC analysis emphasized that there is no relationship between the supply of hospices and 
the hospice enrollment rate (MedPAC March 2015). 
Since a majority of hospice enrollees do not receive care in an inpatient hospice facility, a 
better indicator of geographic access to care may be driving distance to the nearest hospice. 
According to a study Carlson, Bradley et al. (2010) conducted using data from 2008, a large 
majority of hospice beneficiaries (88 percent) lived within 30 minutes driving time of the nearest 
hospice, while 98 percent lived within 60 minutes of the local hospice. Furthermore, the mean 
driving time to the nearest hospice was 15 minutes with certain regional characteristics more 
frequently associated with greater geographic access to hospice: higher population density, 
higher median income, higher educational attainment, higher proportion of African American 
residents, and absence of a state Certificate of Need law (Carlson, Bradley et al. 2010).  
Notable patterns of use: Length of stay 
 
Such shifting patient and provider characteristics have come hand-in-hand with extreme 
patterns of use — both short and long length of stay (LOS) — which, in some instances, could 
indicate poor quality care delivery and inappropriate provider behavior (Aldridge 2015). On the 
one hand, incredibly short stays may signal late referral, limiting patients from receiving 
  15 
palliative services and other resources aimed at symptom management that would have been 
beneficial had they been delivered sooner (Williams 2003, Aldridge 2015). On the other hand, 
long stays are concerning because they may be associated with patients’ inappropriate referral to 
hospice (Aldridge 2015). Although more than half (53.4 percent) of hospice enrollees in 2010 
were enrolled for a short period of time, and, on average, a quarter were enrolled for five days or 
fewer between 2000 and 2010, the main area of concern among policymakers and regulators has 
been long stays (Thompson, Carlson et al. 2012, Aldridge 2015). As opposed to short LOS, 
which likely reflects difficulty providing accurate prognoses earlier in the course of a patient’s 
illness or hesitation on the part of a patient and his/her family to forgo curative treatments, long 
LOS may reflect misaligned hospice incentives — which could require payment system reform 
(MedPAC March 2015) (2014).6 Because hospice stays are typically more expensive at the 
beginning and the end of the episode of care and Medicare reimburses according to a daily rate 
regardless of services rendered (for more details on the payment system, see Hospice payment 
system section below), patients with longer stays are more financially lucrative (Gandhi 2012). 
Beginning in the late 1990s, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office 
of Inspector General (OIG) began investigating potential fraudulent behavior among hospices 
trying to enroll patients more likely to have longer LOS. Such practices, the OIG concluded, 
could stem from hospices trying to leverage the per diem payment structure (Gandhi 2012). 
When Medicare began reimbursing hospices in 1983, the average lifetime LOS was between 55 
and 75 days (May 2015). LOS has increased steadily since that time to 88 days in 2013, with 
growth at the 90th percentile from 141 to 246 days between 2000 and 2012 (MedPAC March 
                                                
6Short stays may also reflect misaligned incentives, but these are likely driven by the larger payment system, in 
which the fee-for-service reimbursement structure encourages the use of high-intensity treatments and discourages 
earlier hospice referral. This issue is beyond the scope of this study, however, so we do not discuss these 
implications here. 
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2015). Although hospices cannot predict a patient’s LOS upon referral or enrollment, certain 
conditions are associated with longer LOS — and, thus, the concern among regulators is the 
potential cherry-picking that might occur among providers hoping to gain a more favorable 
financial return on their patient panels (Gandhi 2012). More specifically, according to a 
MedPAC (March 2015) report, in 2013, patients with neurological conditions or whose primary 
diagnosis was debility or adult failure to thrive had substantially longer LOS (147 days and 116 
days, respectively) compared to cancer patients (53 days). Aldridge (2015) found that the largest 
predictor of a long stay was a non-cancer diagnosis. 
Of particular concern is the relationship between long LOS and hospice provider type. In 
contrast with non-profit hospices, for-profits have a much longer LOS — 105 days compared to 
68 days in 2013. Although for-profit hospices enroll patients with diagnoses that tend to have 
longer LOS in greater numbers than their non-profit and government-owned counterparts, they 
also have longer LOS across all diagnosis types, yielding higher profit margins overall (MedPAC 
March 2015). LOS also varies by setting of care, in which hospice patients in assisted living 
facilities had an average LOS of 152 days in 2013, followed by nursing facilities (111 days) and 
patients at home (89 days). In January 2015, the HHS OIG released a report discussing the 
implications of for-profit hospices receiving a large share of their respective revenues from 
assisted living facility patients (January 2015). 
Hospice payment system 
 
In the early 1980s, when policymakers first conceived of the Medicare hospice program, 
they launched 26 demonstrations to examine the cost-effectiveness of the potential benefit as 
well as the services that should be offered (Ruiz 2011, MedPAC October 2014). Hospice 
payments have remained virtually unchanged since that time — despite the fact that utilization 
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and cost patterns have transformed significantly over the last 30-plus years of the program’s 
existence (MedPAC October 2014). CMS pays hospice providers a daily rate for each enrolled 
patient, whether or not the patient uses services in a given day and regardless of patient diagnosis 
(MedPAC March 2015). The per diem rate is calculated based on four base categories of care, 
which are updated annually according to the hospital market basket index7 and encompass a 
labor- and non-labor-related adjustment (CMS August 2015). Notably, the hospice payment 
system does not make adjustments for case mix, urban/rural location, or particularly costly 
outlier patients (Nicosia, Reardon et al. June 2006).  
The four categories include: routine home care, continuous home care, inpatient respite 
care, and general inpatient care; Table 1 provides an overview of these payment categories and 
associated reimbursement rates (MedPAC October 2014).  
Table 1. Categories of hospice care 
Category of care Purpose Percent of hospice days (2013) 
Base payment rate 
(2015) 
Routine home care Typical/basic care 97.6 percent $159.34/day 
Continuous home care Crisis situations 0.4 percent $38.75/hour 
Inpatient respite care 
To provide reprieve for 
caregiver (short periods 
only) 
0.3 percent $164.81/day 
General inpatient care Inpatient services 1.7 percent $706.77/day 
Adapted from MedPAC (March 2015). 
 
Routine home care is ubiquitous, accounting for 97.6 percent of hospice days in 2013 and 
reimbursed at a rate of $159.34 per day in 2015 (MedPAC March 2015). Continuous home care 
represents the other end of the spectrum, billed in 0.4 percent of hospice days in 2013 (MedPAC 
March 2015). Because continuous home care is intended for acute crisis situations, it is the only 
                                                
7Section 3401(g) of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandated the hospice payment rate be annually reduced to 
reflect changes in economic productivity, starting in fiscal year (FY) 2013. 
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care category reimbursed at an hourly rate — $38.75 per hour in 2015. More than half (58 
percent) of hospices did not provide continuous care to their patients in 2013 (MedPAC March 
2015). Inpatient respite care is available to provide brief stints of reprieve for the primary 
caregiver when patients are receiving hospice services at home (MedPAC March 2015). The per 
diem is $164.81, accounting for 0.3 percent of 2013 hospice days. Similar to continuous home 
care, inpatient respite care is not widely used, with 25 percent of hospices not delivering this 
category of care in 2015 (MedPAC March 2015). General inpatient care represents the highest 
per diem rate at $708.77 in 2015; 1.7 percent of hospice days that year were paid for with general 
inpatient care (MedPAC March 2015). According to a 2015 MedPAC analysis, 28 percent of 
hospices did not provide general inpatient care in 2013, while 19 percent delivered neither 
general inpatient nor continuous home care. And even more limited, 12 percent of hospices — 
mostly smaller hospices — provided only routine home care in 2013 (MedPAC March 2015). 
CMS adjusts the per diem base rate according to the hospice wage index — based on the 
previous fiscal year’s (FY) pre-reclassified, pre-floor hospital wage index adjustment factors8 — 
to account for geographic differences across markets (2011, CMS August 2015, MedPAC 
October 2014). CMS determines geographic location for the labor adjustment based on the Core-
Based Statistical Area (CBSA)9 in which the beneficiary resides when receiving routine or 
continuous home care (CMS August 2015). Adjustments for patients receiving inpatient respite 
care or general inpatient care are based on the location of the facility at which the patient obtains 
care (CMS August 2015). For urban CBSAs that do not have a hospital from which to derive the 
                                                
8This index refers to values prior to changes CMS makes on the basis of hospital requests for labor market 
classification changes as well as the application of lower limits to the wage index. 
 
9CMS transitioned from an MSA-based to a CBSA-based designation in 2006. Per a 2015 CMS Final Rule, the 
hospice wage index underwent a one-year transition to new Office of Management and Budget CBSA delineations, 
which encompassed a blended wage index for FY 2016. 
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hospice wage index, CMS calculates a statewide pre-reclassified, pre-floor CBSA average and 
uses this as a proxy; only Hinesville, Georgia, required this calculation for FY 2016. In contrast, 
CMS calculates the hospice wage index for rural CBSAs without a hospital by averaging the pre-
reclassified, pre-floor wage data for hospitals in all contiguous CBSAs.10  
Until FY 2016, hospice wage index values below 0.8 were subject to either a budget 
neutrality factor (BANF) adjustment or a hospice floor adjustment, amounting to a 15 percent 
maximum increase to create a wage value no higher than 0.8 (CMS August 2015). CMS began a 
seven-year BANF phase-out (15 percent reduction each year) as mandated by the 2010 Hospice 
Wage Index Final Rule, which was completed in FY 2016 (CMS August 2015). The hospice 
floor adjustment is still in effect.  
The proportion of the base category attributed to the labor- and non-labor-related 
adjustments varies by base category to reflect the estimated proportion of each category likely 
attributable to labor/non-labor costs; the non-labor portion is 100 percent minus the labor portion 
for each base category. More specifically, for routine home care and continuous home care, the 
labor portion is 68.71 percent and the non-labor portion is 31.29 percent; for general inpatient 
care, the labor portion is 64.01 percent and the non-labor portion is 35.99 percent; and for respite 
care, the labor portion is 54.13 percent, whereas the non-labor portion is 45.87 percent (CMS 
August 2015). 
The Medicare hospice program also includes two caps on payments — an inpatient cap 
and an aggregate cap. Seldom exceeded, the inpatient cap limits the provision of inpatient care to 
20 percent of a given hospice’s total Medicare patient days (MedPAC March 2015). CMS 
reimburses hospices that provide inpatient care in excess of this cap at the routine home care rate 
                                                
10Puerto Rico is the only rural CBSA that cannot be classified in this manner; CMS uses the value of 0.4047. 
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(MedPAC March 2015). The purpose of this cap is to ensure hospice care continues to be a 
primarily home-based benefit (May 2015).   
The second cap, which has garnered attention over the last few years due to increased 
scrutiny of trends in excessive length of stays, restricts the aggregate payments hospices receive 
from Medicare within the November 1 to October 31 calendar year11 (MedPAC March 2015, 
May 2015). Hospices must repay Medicare any total payments in excess of the cap amount 
($27,820.75 for the year ending on October 31, 2016) times the number of Medicare 
beneficiaries the hospice serves (CMS August 2015). In essence, CMS implemented the 
aggregate cap to ensure hospices solely provide terminal care and do not exceed conventional 
care expenditures at the end of life; today, the cap penalizes hospices with a high average LOS 
(Aldridge, Schlesinger et al. 2014, May 2015). According to MedPAC (March 2015), the cap 
“represents the only significant fiscal constraint in growth of hospice expenditures for hospice 
care.”  
Until recently, CMS exclusively employed a “streamlined” approach to count patients for 
the cap year, by which hospice patients were counted in only the first year of their hospice 
election (which starts on September 28 and ends on September 27 of the following year) and not 
in subsequent years (CMS August 2015). This counting year differed from the cap year to ensure 
that patients who enrolled in hospice right before the end of the cap year were included in the 
calculation for the following year — in which they likely received more services (CMS August 
2015). Beneficiaries who obtained care from multiple hospices during the cap year were only 
                                                
11This timeframe does not align with the hospice rate update year (also the federal fiscal year (FY)), which extends 
from October 1 to September 30. The FY 2012 Hospice Wage Index Proposed Rule considered aligning the cap 
accounting year with the FY, but this change never came to fruition. Finally, in a Final Rule published in the Federal 
Register on August 6, 2015, CMS changed the cap year to align with the federal FY starting in FY 2017. 
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included in an individual hospice’s cap calculation as the proportion of the patient’s total hospice 
days spent in that hospice (CMS August 2015). 
The FY 2012 Hospice Wage Index Final Rule added the cap calculation to include an 
alternative patient-by-patient proportional methodology — a slightly different way to count 
beneficiaries — which applied to new hospices or existing hospices that decided not to use the 
original streamlined methodology (May 2015). By the 2013 cap year, a majority of hospices had 
transitioned to patient-by-patient methodology, with only 486 hospices still relying on the 
streamlined approach (CMS August 2015). Through this new method, hospices count 
beneficiaries by dividing the number of days a patient spent in that hospice during the cap year 
by the total number of hospice days for a given patient across all years in hospice (CMS August 
2015). The new patient-by-patient methodology counts patients according to the cap accounting 
year (November 1-October 31) rather than the timeframe used in the streamlined approach 
(September 28-September 27) (CMS August 2015).  
When initially enacted in 1983, the cap amount equaled $6500 per beneficiary; Medicare 
adjusts this amount each year to reflect annual changes in the consumer price index for urban 
consumers (CPI-U) medical care expenditure category based on the CPI-U medical expenditures 
amount in the fifth month of the current accounting year — in this case, March (CMS August 
2015, May 2015). To calculate the annual cap amount, Medicare divides this current rate 
(444.020 in March 2015) by the rate from March 1984 (105.4) and then multiplies this amount 
by the original cap base amount in 1984 ($6500) (CMS August 2015). In FY 2016, CMS further 
multiplied this rate by an additional 1.016 to account for the payment system update during that 
year, ultimately yielding a cap amount of $27,820.75. 
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Despite these annual updates to the cap calculation literature notes potentially troubling 
trends regarding the rates of hospices exceeding — or nearly exceeding — the cap, as well as the 
types of providers more likely to incur the penalty. The proportion of hospices surpassing the cap 
peaked in 2009, although the rate began to grow again a couple years later, from 9.8 percent in 
2011 to 11 percent of hospices in 2012. And in 2012, more hospices finished the year just below 
the cap compared to several years earlier in 200612 (MedPAC March 2015, Plotzke, Christian et 
al. May 2014). According to an analysis Plotzke, Christian et al. (May 2014) conducted for CMS 
in anticipation of potential revisions to the hospice payment system, newer hospices certified 
since 2000 were more likely to exceed the cap in 2012 (19.9 percent) than those certified in the 
1990s (4.0 percent) or earlier (1.2 percent); for-profit hospices were also more likely to exceed 
the cap than their non-profit counterparts (17.9 percent compared to 2.4 percent). Similarly, 15.1 
percent of freestanding compared to 2.7 percent of facility-based hospices surpassed the 
aggregate cap in 2012, while 14.2 percent of urban and 7.3 percent of rural hospices experienced 
the same trend (Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014). Finally, hospices operating in the South 
were the most likely to exceed the cap (16.5 percent) compared to the West (14.2 percent), 
Northeast (5.0 percent), and Midwest (4.0 percent) (Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014). Such 
2012 trends appeared to hold across time, as Plotzke, Christian et al. (May 2014) found the same 
hospice-level predictors in 2006. A follow-up analysis using 2014 data found similar trends in 
above-cap hospices with significant geographic variations (Plotzke, Christian et al. 2015). States 
with the highest rate of above-cap hospices that year included: Nevada (40.7 percent), South 
Carolina (29.6 percent), Mississippi (29.4 percent), and Georgia (27.2 percent) (Plotzke, 
                                                
122006 was the first year of data included in this analysis. 
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Christian et al. 2015). In comparison, fewer than one percent of hospices in a number of states 
were above the cap in 2014 (Plotzke, Christian et al. 2015). 
Misaligned incentives and the potential for reform? 
 
Such LOS patterns have prompted calls to reform the hospice payment system that more 
appropriately account for its evolution over the last 30 years. A year before Congress passed the 
ACA, MedPAC released a report recommending reforms to the hospice payment system to better 
reflect the trajectory of episodes of care. Although, among other reforms, Section 3132(a) of the 
ACA authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to conduct a review of the payment 
system to make budget-neutral reforms, MedPAC’s 2015 report conveyed the same message as 
its 2009 report. “Medicare’s hospice payment system is not well aligned with the costs of 
providing care through a hospice episode,” the report said (MedPAC March 2015). Reliance on a 
per diem has created perverse financial incentives for hospices to not only cherry pick lower cost 
patients but also to enroll patients for longer stays (Aldridge Carlson, Barry et al. 2012, Kelley 
and Meier 2014, MedPAC March 2015). As such, MedPAC recommended the payment rate be 
restructured in the form of a u-shaped curve, in which hospices are paid more at the beginning 
and the end of an episode of care and less in the middle. The Commission also recommended a 
focused review of hospices with excessive long stays. 
Plotzke, Christian et al. (May 2014) delivered a report to CMS in 2014, which served as 
the first step on the path toward payment reform, spurring an effort to monitor vulnerabilities in 
the payment system using real-time claims data. This work culminated in passage of the 
Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation (IMPACT) Act on Sept. 18, 2014 
(Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014, May 2015). IMPACT required further CMS hospice 
monitoring activities, including: surveying hospices every three years for the next decade and 
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implementing an ACA provision for face-to-face medical review of patients in hospice more 
than 180 days (May 2015).  
A May 2015 CMS Proposed Rule referenced both the Plotzke, Christian et al. (May 
2014) study as well as the 2009 MedPAC recommendations in its proposal to alter routine home 
care payments (Section III.A) to reflect the beneficiaries’ LOS by offering a higher base payment 
for the first 60 days and a reduced rate thereafter,13 with a service intensity add-on (Nicosia, 
Reardon et al.), which would pay for service rendered in the last seven days of life, provided the 
patient meets certain criteria (May 2015). The SIA would equal the continuous home care rate 
multiplied by the amount of direct patient care a registered nurse or social worker provides in the 
last days of a patient’s life. The Rule also proposed changes to the calculation of the aggregate 
cap and the hospice wage index, including aligning the cap accounting year with the federal FY 
starting in FY 2017 (Section III.C and Section III.D) (May 2015). CMS ultimately published its 
Final Rule in the Federal Register on August 6, 2015, implementing the aforementioned changes 
on Jan. 1, 2016 (CMS August 2015). As such, for FY 2016, the per diem for a typical day on 
routine care was $187 for days 1-60 and $147 thereafter (MedPAC March 2016). During the last 
seven days of life, CMS reimburses up to four hours of nursing or social work visits a day at $39 
per hour (MedPAC March 2016).   
Disenrollment from hospice 
 
Concerns regarding potential misalignment of hospice incentives have also increased 
scrutiny over the rate of live discharges (or disenrollments) from hospice, which, in some cases 
could reflect good quality care — through adherence to patient preferences, stabilization of 
                                                
13CMS also considered a “tiered” payment system but determined that this approach relied too heavily on the patient 
receiving skilled visits in the last few days of life. 
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conditions, etc. — but, in others, potentially inappropriate behaviors motivated by the payment 
system structure. Although the most common way to be discharged from hospice is through 
death, there are also a significant proportion of patients who disenroll from hospice while they 
are still alive. Once discharged, the patient resumes traditional Medicare coverage that had been 
waived upon hospice enrollment (May 2015). The reasons for live hospice discharges vary and 
can be either patient/family- or hospice-initiated, as shown in Figure 1 (Carlson, Herrin et al. 
2009, LeSage, Borgert et al. 2014). Patients may choose to disenroll to pursue life-sustaining 
treatment because they are dissatisfied with the hospice care they are receiving, because they 
lacked a fundamental understanding of the hospice program (i.e., its focus on comfort rather than 
curative care) upon initial enrollment, or as a result of sudden changes in hospice personnel 
(Casarett, Marenberg et al. 2001, Carlson, Herrin et al. 2009, LeSage, Borgert et al. 2014). They 
may also disenroll because their condition has stabilized or a family member/caregiver suddenly 
becomes available to provide care (Kutner, Blake et al. 2002, LeSage, Borgert et al. 2014).  
Although the decision to revoke hospice care lies in the beneficiary’s hands (42 CFR 
§418.28) — federal regulations require that the patient and/or proxy sign a statement attesting to 
this course of action — providers can initiate discharge through a written physician discharge 
order (42 CFR §418.26) .14 Hospices may discharge a patient alive if they determine the patient 
is no longer eligible for hospice (i.e., the patient’s health status improves and the prognosis 
changes); if the patient moves from the hospice’s service area; if the patient is disruptive, 
aggressive, or uncooperative; or in situations when the hospice does not have a contract with a 
facility (e.g., hospital) to which the patient must be transferred (LeSage, Borgert et al. 2014, 
                                                
14Although hospice revocation and discharge both result in a patient disenrolling from the Medicare hospice 
program, federal regulations distinguish between the two acts: Patients revoke hospice care, while providers 
discharge patients. 
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Chung 2015). Furthermore, it is possible that hospice-initiated disenrollment could reflect 
improper behavior on the part of the hospice, with hospice providers electing to avoid 
hospitalization costs by disenrolling the patient when he/she requires short-term inpatient care to 
stabilize acute conditions associated with the terminal illness (Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014, Chung 
2015). According to federal regulations, hospices must contract with institutional settings prior to 
making a general inpatient referral (i.e., hospitals and SNFs) and are financially responsible for 
reimbursing the hospital or SNF the general inpatient rate received from Medicare. When 
patients disenroll from hospice prior to an inpatient stay, such costs fall on the institutional 
setting rather than the hospice (Chung, Richards et al. 2015). 
Figure 1.  Reasons for patient- and provider-initiated live disenrollment 
 
 
 
 LeSage, Borgert et al. (2014) conducted a medical chart review in one hospice between 
2006 and 2011 and found that patients were discharged from hospice because: they no longer 
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met the hospice criteria (57.5 percent), the patient/family initiated the discharge (30 percent), 
they were transferred to another hospice (10 percent), or the hospice staff deemed the patient 
unsafe (2.5 percent). Another more representative study found that 32 percent of live discharges 
in 2007 occurred because the patient stabilized or improved, 29 percent occurred because the 
patient opted to pursue more aggressive treatment, 13 percent occurred because the patient 
moved outside the hospice service area, and 27 percent occurred for “other” reasons (Chung 
2015). Such other reasons fell into three distinct categories: 1) the hospice was unable to contract 
with a hospital or nursing facility in which the patient was to be admitted, 2) the hospice could 
not provide an inpatient bed for the patient, or 3) a crisis occurred that the hospice could not 
control (e.g., the patient’s caregiver called 911 instead of the hospice) (Chung 2015).  
Beginning in July 2012, Medicare included new occurrence codes on claims to allow for 
further clarification of the reasons for a live discharge, differentiating between patient- and 
hospice-initiated discharge (Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014). MedPAC’s 2016 report on 
hospices found that 39 percent of discharges occurred because a patient revoked his/her service, 
while the rest were provider-initiated, primarily because the hospice deemed the patient to be no 
longer terminally ill (MedPAC March 2016). Another study using claims from the last four 
months of 2012 additionally found that African American and cancer patients had higher rates of 
patient-initiated revocation (Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014). 
The reasons underlying live disenrollment are key to determining whether this pattern of 
EOL service utilization reflects good or poor quality care delivery. A 2011 technical advisory 
panel convened to provide recommendations for the development of hospice quality metrics15 
                                                
15The ACA required for the public reporting of hospice quality metrics through the Hospice Quality Reporting 
Program. Until that time, there had been no publicly reported quality data on hospice service delivery. 
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suggested several claims-based measures, including live discharge rates, as indicators of 
potential poor quality care delivery (MedPAC March 2015). Because live disenrollment may 
create discontinuities in care and disrupt ongoing patient-provider relationships — oftentimes 
landing frail and terminally ill patients in the hospital, ED, or ICU — it is important to 
understand the key drivers of this trend (Casarett, Marenberg et al. 2001, Taylor, Steinhauser et 
al. 2008, Carlson, Herrin et al. 2010, Unroe, Greiner et al. 2012). Patient-preference-driven 
discharges and condition stabilization may reflect an EOL system that appropriately caters to the 
changing individual needs/prognoses of patients, while discharges that occur because hospices 
do not have the appropriate resources to provide care or — worse — because hospices do not 
want to shoulder the financial burden, could point to signs of provider misuse or abuse of the 
hospice benefit.  
Current state of the literature 
 
To date, we found 15 peer-reviewed articles published between 2001 and 2016 focused 
solely on exploring patterns of live discharge from hospice. Despite the limited number of 
studies on the topic and the range of data sources used (across nearly two decades), the papers 
point to similar trends across patient- and hospice-level predictors/outcomes of live 
disenrollment. Overall, the studies together suggest that non-White, unmarried patients with 
non-cancer diagnoses who have had a longer LOS in hospice are more likely to be discharged 
alive than other types of patients. At the hospice level, smaller, newer (five years or fewer), for-
profit hospices operating in more competitive markets have higher rates of disenrollment.  
Patient-level predictors 
  
The majority of the studies on this topic catalogue some component of patient-level live 
disenrollment predictors, with nearly half exploring the relationship between 
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comorbidities/primary diagnoses and disenrollment and others reporting statistical significance 
of covariates: age, race, sex, marital status/caregivers, average LOS, and institutional residence. 
Among the four studies that reported a statistically significant relationship between age and the 
likelihood of live disenrollment, one study found that younger patients were more likely to 
withdraw from hospice before death (Casarett, Marenberg et al. 2001), while two reported that 
older age was associated with live discharge from hospice (Johnson, Kuchibhatla et al. 2008, 
Carlson, Herrin et al. 2009). Another study, still, reported that the median age of 72 for the group 
of individuals discharged alive was not statistically different from the group that died while in 
hospice (Kutner, Blake et al. 2002). 
The four articles that reported a statistically significant relationship between race and live 
discharge all pointed to the same relationship: Non-White patients (African Americans, 
Hispanics, and Other race/ethnicity) were more likely to be discharged alive than White patients 
(Johnson, Kuchibhatla et al. 2008, Carlson, Herrin et al. 2009, Unroe, Greiner et al. 2012, Teno, 
Plotzke et al. 2014, Aldridge 2015). One study found that 4.5 percent of African American 
patients revoked hospice specifically to pursue more aggressive care compared to 2.5 percent of 
White patients, which is consistent with evidence that Non-White populations tend to 
receive/prefer a higher intensity of care at the end of life (Chiriboga 2008, Johnson, Kuchibhatla 
et al. 2008, Hanchate, Kronman et al. 2009). Fewer studies reported a statistically significant 
relationship between sex and live disenrollment, with one suggesting that males were more likely 
to disenroll alive (Casarett, Marenberg et al. 2001) while two later studies reported that a larger 
proportion of females had a live discharge (Kutner, Blake et al. 2002, Johnson, Elbert-Avila et al. 
2012). In terms of marital status/caregiver relationships, two studies found that unmarried 
hospice patients were more likely to disenroll from hospice before death while individuals with a 
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primary caregiver were more likely to die in hospice care (Casarett, Marenberg et al. 2001, 
Kutner, Blake et al. 2002). In addition to caregiver support, living in an institutional setting may 
also be associated with being discharged alive, although this covariate was only considered in 
one study (Kutner, Blake et al. 2002). 
Overall, the literature points to a positive correlation between non-cancer diagnosis and 
live discharge. Among the six studies that specifically reported results on the relationship 
between comorbidities/primary diagnoses and likelihood of having a live discharge, four 
compared cancer to non-cancer patients, and all four reached this same conclusion (Casarett, 
Marenberg et al. 2001, Kutner, Blake et al. 2002, Taylor, Steinhauser et al. 2008, Teno, Plotzke 
et al. 2014). More specifically, the most common primary diagnoses among patients discharged 
alive were: dementia, failure to thrive,16 cerebral vascular accident, congestive heart failure, and 
pneumonia, according to a recent study, which used 2010 Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) claims 
data (Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). Further, Carlson, Herrin et al. (2009) found that patients with a 
higher score on the Charlson Comorbidity Index17 were more likely to have a live disenrollment, 
whereas, Kutner, Blake et al. (2002) reported that patients with three or more activities of daily 
living (ADLs) were more likely to die in hospice. 
Findings related to LOS were disparate, with one study reporting a mean LOS prior to 
live discharge of 70 days (Kutner, Blake et al. 2002), while another reported a median of 22 days 
(Johnson, Kuchibhatla et al. 2008) — and yet another found a median stay of 236 days prior to 
live disenrollment, compared to 12 days for those who died while receiving hospice care 
                                                
16In October 2014, CMS restricted the use of non-specific condition codes as the principal diagnosis on a hospice 
claim (August 2014). Hospice Manual Update for Diagnosis Reporting and Filing Hospice Notice of Election 
(NOE) and Termination or Revocation of Election., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.. 
 
17The Charlson Comorbidity Index is based on International Classification of Diseases (ICD) diagnosis codes. 
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(Johnson, Elbert-Avila et al. 2012). Despite the range of these estimates, there is evidence that 
patients enrolled longer are more likely to be discharged alive; in fact, as Johnson, Elbert-Avila 
et al. (2012) report, individuals enrolled for longer than 180 days had more than 12 times the 
odds of being discharged alive relative to those enrolled in hospice for fewer than 180 days. 
Similarly, Teno, Plotzke et al. (2014) found that 26.6 percent of live discharges in 2010 were 
among patients who had a LOS of 180 days or more. On the other end of the spectrum, 10.8 
percent of live discharges represented patients who had spent seven days or fewer on hospice 
(Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). 
Patient-level outcomes  
 
Beyond predictors, the literature — particularly the studies published in more recent 
years — explores some of the patient-level outcomes associated with live disenrollment, with a 
particular emphasis on patterns of re-enrollment in hospice as well as length of survival 
following discharge; a sampling of studies also explore patterns of post-discharge utilization 
(e.g., inpatient hospitalizations) and costs. Across the studies, the rate of live disenrollment 
ranged from five to 18.5 percent, although one study that focused on patients who disenrolled 
expressly to pursue more aggressive care estimated the rate of disenrollment to be 2.8 percent; 
Plotzke, Christian et al. (May 2014) report to CMS on hospice payment reform recommendations 
estimated the rate to be 18.1 percent in 2012 (an increase from 13.2 percent in 2000 and 17.2 
percent in 2006); MedPAC’s 2016 hospice report found the average rate in 2012 to be 18.5 
percent, decreasing to 18.4 percent in 2013 and 17.2 percent in 2014 (MedPAC March 2016).  In 
contrast, Aldridge (2015), using a 2000 and 2010 cross-section of FFS claims, estimated that the 
disenrollment rate decreased from 2000 to 2010. Such variation in the estimated overall rate is 
likely a product of the range of datasets employed as well as the years of that data, which, 
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spanning nearly two decades, encompassed a period of significant change in the hospice industry 
(Aldridge, Schlesinger et al. 2014). 
Nine of the 15 studies noted a distinct pattern of disenrollment and re-enrollment in the 
same hospice, often sandwiching an inpatient hospital stay. Estimates of the proportion of 
patients experiencing such a trend ranged, although three of the studies reported that 
approximately one-third of those who disenrolled re-enrolled shortly thereafter (Kutner, Meyer et 
al. 2004, Carlson, Herrin et al. 2010, LeSage, Borgert et al. 2014). And among those who re-
enrolled, 75 percent used the same hospice; only 10 percent of all disenrollees re-enrolled with a 
different hospice (Carlson, Herrin et al. 2009). Despite this disenrollment-reenrollment trend, 
between 2000 and 2010, fewer than one percent of patients experienced more than two 
enrollment-disenrollment-reenrollment patterns (Aldridge 2015).  
In 2010, 7.6 percent of all patients discharged alive endured a pattern of hospice 
discharge, hospital admission and discharge, and hospice re-enrollment18 (Teno, Plotzke et al. 
2014). In fact, 6.4 percent (unadjusted) of those with a live discharge were defined as having a 
“burdensome transition” — hospitalization within two days of hospice discharge followed by a 
hospice readmission within two days of hospital discharge — in 2012, according to a follow-up 
analysis conducted by Plotzke, Christian et al. (May 2014). That rate represented a noticeable 
increase from 3.4 percent in 2000 (Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014). Adjusted analyses 
determined that burdensome transitions were higher in for-profits (6.4 percent) compared to non-
profits (4.0 percent) in 2012 (Prsic, Plotzke et al. 2016), and that, when controlling for chain 
status, for-profits without a chain had a higher burdensome transition rate compared to their 
chain counterparts (Teno, Bowman et al. 2015). Non-profit hospices had the lowest rate of 
                                                
18A majority of those discharged alive (75.9 percent) were not hospitalized within 30 days of disenrollment; 16.5 
percent were hospitalized but not subsequently readmitted to hospice. 
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burdensome transitions (Teno, Bowman et al. 2015). Hospices at the 90th percentile in discharges 
occurring on or after 180 days in hospice or on or before seven days exhibited similar trends by 
chain affiliation and profit status (Teno, Bowman et al. 2015). 
A number of the 15 of the peer-reviewed studies explored this pattern of hospice 
discharge followed by a hospital stay — and the trend was clear: Those who disenrolled were 
more likely to be hospitalized, admitted to an emergency department (ED), or admitted to the 
intensive care unit (ICU) than those who remained continuously enrolled in hospice until death 
(Taylor, Steinhauser et al. 2008, Carlson, Herrin et al. 2010, Unroe, Greiner et al. 2012). Among 
patients with cancer, the trend appeared particularly striking, with 39.8 percent of disenrollees 
(compared to 1.6 percent of those who remained on hospice) being admitted as an inpatient to 
the hospital, ultimately spending almost three times as many days in the hospital as their 
counterparts (19.3 vs. 6.7 days) (Carlson, Herrin et al. 2010). ED and ICU admission were 
similarly significant: 33.9 percent of disenrollees vs. 3.1 percent of those who remained on 
hospice landed in the ED, while 5.7 percent compared to 0.1 percent accessed the ICU (Carlson, 
Herrin et al. 2010). Such trends are not specific to cancer patients, however. Across all patient 
groups, using data from 1993-2000, Taylor, Steinhauser et al. (2008) found that only 2.6 percent 
of those who remained continuously enrolled were admitted to a hospital, while 31.3 percent of 
patients who were discharged (and did not subsequently re-enroll) and 42.4 percent of those who 
disenrolled and re-enrolled ultimately entered a hospital. 
The timing of such hospitalizations underscores a potential insufficiency in the care 
provided at the end of life to individuals who disenroll from hospice: Twenty-five percent of 
individuals who experienced a live discharge were hospitalized within 48 hours of that discharge 
(Carlson, Herrin et al. 2010). Similarly, Teno, Plotzke et al. (2014) estimated that nearly a 
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quarter of all disenrollees nationwide in 2010 were hospitalized one or more times within 30 
days of leaving hospice. Such patterns associated with patient movement into and out of hospice, 
as well as institutional settings, have negative ramifications for patients and their caregivers. 
According to two recently published qualitative studies, discharged patients described feelings of 
suffering pertaining to loneliness, abandonment, uncertainty, and anger (Campbell 2015), while 
caregivers of dementia patients said they were confused, emotionally unprepared, and unsettled 
after the decision to discharge (Wladkowski 2016). 
Oftentimes hospitalizations not only exact a physical and emotional toll on patients and 
their families — but they also elicit a hefty price tag (Horn and Tesh 2000, Meier 2011). On 
average, Medicare paid $30,848 for individuals who disenrolled from hospice compared to 
$6,537 for those continuously enrolled in hospice, according to Carlson, Herrin et al. (2010), 
who followed 90,826 cancer patients enrolled in hospice between 1998 and 2002. Eight years 
later, in 2010, hospice disenrollees accounted for $664 million in Medicare expenditures in the 
30 days post-hospice discharge (Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). During that time, Medicare also 
reimbursed SNFs $68.6 million for live disenrollees in the month after discharge from hospice. 
For the group of individuals who never returned to hospice, Teno, Plotzke et al. (2014) estimated 
that Medicare reimbursed $27.8 million for Part B and $4.4 million for outpatient services; those 
who ultimately re-enrolled in hospice within 30 days accounted for  $19.3 million in Part B and 
$1.8 million in outpatient Medicare spending. 
Although many of the studies tried to ascertain trends in the timing of disenrollment as 
well as survival times post-discharge from hospice, neither outcomes yielded conclusive findings 
across the literature. Average time to disenrollment ranged from a median of 28 days (cancer 
patients only) in one study to 85 in another (Carlson, Herrin et al. 2010, Teno, Plotzke et al. 
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2014). Furthermore, Carlson, Herrin et al. (2009) suggested that 35 percent of disenrollees left 
hospice within two weeks; Teno, Plotzke et al. (2014) estimated that 25 percent left within three 
weeks. Survival analyses produced similarly inconsistent evidence across five different studies. 
More specifically, the two studies that used data from a single hospice chain (VITAS) found 
drastically longer survival times following disenrollment (i.e., 75.5 percent of those who 
disenrolled were alive after one year) compared to the other four studies (Johnson, Kuchibhatla 
et al. 2008, Johnson, Elbert-Avila et al. 2012, LeSage, Borgert et al. 2014). One reported that 57 
percent of disenrollees died within 30 days (Carlson, Herrin et al. 2010); and two others found 35 
percent (Kutner, Blake et al. 2002) and 40 percent (LeSage, Borgert et al. 2014) died within six 
months of discharge, respectively. 
Hospice-level predictors and outcomes  
 
Only four of the 15 peer-reviewed articles that explored trends in live disenrollment 
examined hospice-level predictors and outcomes; however, a few federal reports on the hospice 
payment system also explored some of these trends as part of larger studies. Across the peer-
reviewed studies, the mean rate of disenrollment across hospices was found to be 15.3 percent, 
according to a study using Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program (SEER) 
Medicare data from 1998-2002 (Carlson, Herrin et al. 2009). When eliminating hospices with a 
small sample size (fewer than 10 observations per year) from the analysis, the mean rate dropped 
to 11.5 percent with a range of zero to 38 percent across hospices (Carlson, Herrin et al. 2009). 
Similarly, a later study using Medicare FFS claims from 2010 reported the rate varied from 11.5 
percent (25th percentile) to 20.5 percent (75th percentile) among hospices with at least 30 
discharges (Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). A follow-up CMS report using 2012 data estimated the 
mean rate across hospices to be 22.5 percent in 2012 (Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014), while 
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MedPAC asserted that 10 percent of providers had a disenrollment rate of 29 percent or greater 
that year (MedPAC March 2015). 
In terms of hospice-level predictors, the two peer-reviewed studies only overlapped in 
two covariates — time in operation and hospice size – and both concluded that newer and 
smaller hospices had higher rates of live disenrollment than older and larger hospices, indicating 
that experience and resources could account for some of the variation in rates across providers 
(Carlson, Herrin et al. 2009, Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). Notably, there was no statistically 
significant difference between older for-profit and non-profit hospices in that study (Teno, 
Plotzke et al. 2014). Both Carlson, Herrin et al. (2009) and Teno, Plotzke et al. (2014) looked at 
the relationship between urban vs. rural location, and neither found a statistically significant 
association. 
Furthermore, Teno, Plotzke et al. (2014) determined that newer (less than five years since 
receiving Medicare certification), for-profit hospices that exceeded their aggregate 
reimbursement caps were most likely to have high disenrollment rates. Through a national 
survey of hospice providers conducted from 2008-2009 Aldridge, Schlesinger et al. (2014), 
found a similar relationship between for-profit status, likelihood of exceeding the aggregate cap, 
and patient disenrollment.  
In particular, hospices that exceeded their aggregate cap had an average live 
disenrollment rate of 38.8 percent in 2012, compared to 17.4 percent among hospice below the 
cap (Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). Plotzke, Christian et al. (May 2014) furthermore found that the 
timing of live discharge may also be tied to a hospice’s risk of hitting its ceiling, with the rate of 
live discharge progressively increasing across hospices grouped according to percentage of 
aggregate cap attained – in overall adjusted live discharge rate, rate of patient revocation, and 
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rate of patients deemed no longer terminally ill (Plotzke, Christian et al. 2015). For example, the 
percentage of live discharges attributed to hospices at 0-20 percent of their cap in 2012 was 12.5 
percent, whereas, the rate for hospices at 150-plus percent of their annual cap was 72.4 percent 
(Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). A more recent study expanded upon this knowledge to ascertain the 
relationship between the percentage of cap attainment and monthly rates of live discharge for 
year-end above- and below-cap hospices, using a 10 percent random sample of beneficiaries in 
2012-14 (Plotzke, Christian et al. 2015). The study estimated that the rate of live discharge for 
above- and below-cap groups increased in the later part of the cap year (July through October), 
providing some evidence that the cap year may influence the timing of live discharges.  
The rate of live discharge by percentage of aggregate cap attained did not increase 
uniformly across primary diagnoses, with a high of 87.8 percent live disenrollment for non-CHF 
heart failure patients in hospices at 150-plus percent of their aggregate caps. Pneumonia and 
cancer patients had the lowest live discharge rates across cap levels, though the relationship 
between a hospice’s percentage of aggregate cap attained and the rate of live discharge steadily 
increase across all conditions (Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). MedPAC expressed concern over this 
relationship in its annual 2015 hospice payment system report, encouraging OIG and CMS to 
review admission practices for hospices in excess of their aggregate caps, as this trend may 
indicate such hospices are admitting patients ineligible for the program (MedPAC March 2015).  
Market-level predictors and outcomes 
  
Two of the peer-reviewed studies that explored hospice-level predictors/outcomes also 
included a market component to their analyses. In terms of market-level predictors, Carlson, 
Herrin et al. (2009) found that hospices located in more competitive markets had higher rates of 
live disenrollment; the study also reported that the hospice fiscal intermediary accounted for 
  38 
some of the variation in live disenrollment rates. Although Teno, Plotzke et al. (2014) did not 
include any market-level covariates in their multivariate models, they estimated state averages 
for live discharge rates and found significant variation — from a low of 12.8 percent in 
Connecticut to a high of 40.5 percent in Mississippi during 2010 (MedPAC October 2014).19 A 
follow-up government report found the state-level rates during FY 2013 to range from 11.6 
percent in Kentucky to 37.0 percent in Mississippi (Plotzke, Christian et al. 2015). 
Gaps in the literature 
 
Given the relative dearth of peer-reviewed literature on this topic and the range of 
inconsistencies in evidence that exist, there are a number of gaps in the literature that ought to be 
highlighted. Although every study examined disenrollment trends through some combination of 
patient-level demographic/health status covariates, there does not appear to be clear consensus 
on associations between patient-level factors and likelihood of disenrollment from hospice. Such 
variation across studies underscores a need to better understand patient decision-making at the 
end of life, as a multiplicity of factors, often in unique and complex combinations and 
unaccounted for in the data, drive such preferences and make it difficult to “predict” certain 
outcomes based on a finite dataset.  
The absence of qualitative work on this topic highlights a gap in understanding that ought 
to be filled by future work aimed at profiling potential patterns of patient and family decision-
making at the end of life that might ultimately lead to hospice disenrollment (and potential 
reenrollment). There is also room for significant qualitative work focused on better 
understanding provider-initiated disenrollment — how decisions are made across different 
                                                
19Payments to hospices vary geographically based on the hospice wage index as well as a non-labor-related 
adjustment. 
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hospices, the ways in which different providers conceptualize disenrollment in terms of good vs. 
bad quality, and the potential barriers providers experience in keeping patients enrolled in 
hospice until death. 
Although only two peer-reviewed studies explored variations in provider- and market-
level disenrollment patterns, they highlight an additional gap in knowledge that could raise 
concern. Such variation across hospice types — and particularly across states — suggests that 
differences in patient preferences alone may not be driving disenrollment patterns. The literature 
on this topic potentially raises more questions than it answers, underscoring a need to investigate 
the key drivers of provider-initiated disenrollment and whether certain policies (e.g., the hospice 
payment system — particularly the aggregate cap — state CON laws, Medicaid payment rates, 
availability of certain home- and community-based service waivers, and other existing long-term 
services and supports) contribute to some of the state/market-level variations.  
More specifically, Carlson, Herrin et al. (2009)’s finding that market competition is 
associated with disenrollment suggests that the decision to discharge a patient may, perhaps, be 
driven in part by a financial calculus — rather than what is best for the individual patient and 
his/her family. And because many disenrollees are ultimately admitted to the hospital, it is 
possible they are victim of cost-shifting, in which hospices, for certain financial reasons, can no 
longer care for the patient and ultimately send him/her elsewhere for services. The possibility for 
such a phenomenon suggests an urgency in conducting research to better understand the market-
level forces that could incentivize potentially inappropriate discharges from hospice.  
Rationale 
 
The value in conducting research aimed at better understanding patterns of hospice use 
— and potential misuse — cannot be emphasized enough. As the proportion of the U.S. 
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population 65 and older continues to rise and life expectancy continues to increase, the need for a 
highly functioning system of services and supports for individuals nearing the end of life will 
only continue to grow. Although patient preferences certainly vary across individuals, families, 
markets, and larger regions, the variation in patterns of live disenrollment from hospice across 
hospices and markets tells a story of an industry driven by potentially misaligned incentives and 
fragmented care. The development of a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving 
provider-initiated live disenrollment from hospice may yield insights into which aspects of the 
hospice payment system are in greatest need of reform.
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CHAPTER TWO: AIM 1 STUDY 
Factors driving live discharge from hospice: Provider perspectives 
 
The proportion of the U.S. population over the age of 65 is projected to double from 12 to 
20 percent between 2005 and 2040 (Reznik, Shoffner et al. 2005/06). This demographic trend 
will result in a surge in the number of patients seeking end-of-life services. Despite the 
increasing availability and visibility of hospice providers and palliative care programs over the 
last decade, researchers, policymakers, and providers agree that the U.S. health care system is 
still ill-equipped to deliver care to individuals nearing the end of life. Further, the payment 
mechanisms currently in place do not appropriately reflect the complexity of patient social, 
emotional, psychological, and physical needs (2014, MedPAC March 2009).  
The Medicare hospice program has witnessed a more than 400 percent increase in 
spending between 2000 and 2012, with the percentage of 65-plus Medicare decedents accessing 
the benefit increasing from 22.9 to 47.8 percent between 2000 and 2014 (MedPAC March 2016). 
Across the same period of time, the proportion of patients disenrolling from hospice prior to 
death has also steadily increased, peaking at an estimated 18.4 percent of all enrollees in 2013 
(MedPAC March 2016). Due to variations in the rate of live discharge at the hospice- and 
market-level, this outcome has come under federal scrutiny as a potential indicator of poor 
quality (MedPAC March 2016).  
Because live disenrollment may create discontinuities in care and disrupt ongoing 
patient-provider relationships — often landing terminally ill patients in the hospital, emergency 
department, or intensive care unit — it is important to understand the key drivers of this trend
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 (Casarett, Marenberg et al. 2001, Taylor, Steinhauser et al. 2008, Carlson, Herrin et al. 
2010, Unroe, Greiner et al. 2012). Discharges due to patient preferences or condition 
stabilization may reflect a system that appropriately caters to changing patient needs/prognoses, 
while discharges that occur because hospices do not want to shoulder the financial burdens of 
some aspects of desired care could point to signs of provider misuse or abuse of the benefit 
(MedPAC March 2015, MedPAC March 2016). This latter issue is tied to broader concerns 
among regulators that the rising discharge rate reflects an attempt of some hospices to maximize 
the system’s flat daily payment rate20 by inappropriately admitting longer stay patients and then 
discharging them when they live longer than is consistent with the six-month expected prognosis 
for hospice (MedPAC March 2016, CMS May 2015). 
Variations in rates of live disenrollment across hospice types and states indicate that 
patient preferences alone do not drive such patterns of care, but research exploring the drivers of 
live discharge is limited. Secondary data analyses suggest certain patient characteristics, 
including non-cancer diagnosis and longer lengths of stay, are associated with higher rates of live 
discharge (Casarett, Marenberg et al. 2001, Kutner, Blake et al. 2002, Kutner, Meyer et al. 2004, 
Johnson, Kuchibhatla et al. 2008, Taylor, Steinhauser et al. 2008, Carlson, Herrin et al. 2009, 
Carlson, Herrin et al. 2010, Unroe, Greiner et al. 2012, LeSage, Borgert et al. 2014, Teno, 
Plotzke et al. 2014, Aldridge 2015). Despite these patient-level differences, much of the variation 
in live disenrollment patterns remains unexplained: States ranged in average unadjusted live 
discharge rate from 11.6 percent (Kentucky) to 37.0 percent (Mississippi) in FY 2013 (Plotzke, 
                                                
20CMS released its fiscal year (FY) 2016 Hospice Wage Index and Payment Rate Update in August 2015, which 
altered routine home care payments to reflect the beneficiaries’ length of stay by offering a higher base payment for 
the first 60 days and a reduced rate thereafter.  The 2016 rule also included a service intensity add-on, which pays 
for service rendered in the last seven days of life, provided the patient meets certain criteria. The Final Rule went 
into effect January 1, 2016. 
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Christian et al. 2015), and a limited number of studies suggest an association between live 
discharge rates and hospice/market characteristics (e.g., for-profit status) (Carlson, Herrin et al. 
2010, Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014, Teno, Bowman et al. 2015, Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014).  
Given the nuanced nature of live discharges — the fact that it can at times be evidence of 
good quality and at times be evidence of bad — and its significant provider/regional variations, 
there is a need for qualitative work that delves beyond finite secondary datasets to more fully 
clarify the factors underlying these trends. This information is particularly crucial as the Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) considers adopting live discharge rates as a claims-
based national quality indicator (MedPAC March 2016). To date, we are not aware of any 
qualitative studies exploring why the rate of live discharge has been steadily increasing and how 
providers make the decision to disenroll living patients. Accordingly, the objective of this study 
was to ascertain provider perspectives on key drivers of live discharge from the Medicare 
hospice program.  
Study data and methods 
 
We conducted a series of semi-structured telephone-based interviews with hospice 
providers around the country, including medical and executive directors. This approach 
promoted a free-flowing and formative exploration of emergent ideas, while ensuring each 
interview consistently hit on key topics. The University of North Carolina Institutional Review 
Board exempted this study (No. 16-0090). 
Participants 
 
To identify a cohort of interview candidates, we spoke with nationally recognized 
hospice leaders. Recruitment occurred primarily via e-mail — with a standard template tailored 
to each individual — and secondarily by phone if multiple e-mails went unanswered.  
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We recruited participants from a diversity of regions and hospice types, segmenting 
respondents into three groups based on the state-level rate of live discharge (i.e., high, medium, 
and low). We defined states with high rates of discharge as those with a live discharge rate 
greater than 19.7 percent of all discharges; states with medium rates of discharge included those 
between 14.4 and 19.6 percent; states with low discharge rates represented those at or below 14.3 
percent (Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). 21 Within each discharge rate tertile, we sought a diversity of 
respondents across hospice characteristics (e.g., profit status, size, rurality, etc.). We ceased 
recruitment once we reached theme saturation (Guest 2006). 
Interviews 
 
The first author conducted all interviews using a semi-structured interview guide 
informed by a thorough literature review and conceptual model (see Appendix 1, Figure 5) 
depicting the range of pathways through which patients could revoke (patient-initiated) or be 
discharged from hospice (provider-initiated). Due to the wide range of factors affecting live 
discharges, we tailored Donabedian’s structure-process-outcome conceptual model to the study 
(Donabedian 1966). The model specifically drills down on structure — patient, provider, and 
market characteristics, as well as state and federal policies — and its relationship with the 
constellation of patient- and provider-level processes/factors that yield the key outcome of 
interest: live discharge. Interview questions focused primarily on the relationship between 
provider and market characteristics, provider-initiated factors, and live disenrollment. 
Investigators experienced with qualitative research methods and hospice care delivery 
vetted the interview guide. Each interview began with a brief introduction and warm-up, which 
                                                
21We based these cut-offs on visual inspection of a state-level heat map in the analysis conducted by Teno et al. 
(2014). No data were provided with the exact percentage value for each state. 
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incorporated broad questions about the interviewee’s background and basic structure of his/her 
hospice (e.g., average daily census). We promised respondents anonymity to encourage candor 
during the interviews; all interviews lasted an hour or less. 
The main substance of interviews covered three broad topics: 1) barriers to keeping 
patients continuously enrolled in hospice until death, 2) best practices associated with live 
discharge, and 3) solutions to barriers identified during the first part of discussions. We 
transitioned to the topic of live discharge by asking respondents to describe, based on their 
professional experience, the “factors that drive live discharge” — particularly those that they 
thought might be contributing to the rising rate nationally. For individuals who had previously 
worked at other hospices or in other markets, we asked them to compare their experiences in an 
effort to broadly understand differences in business/care delivery approaches across hospices and 
markets. To elicit possible solutions, we asked respondents to imagine they worked for the CMS 
and suggest ways to “fix” the barriers they had mentioned. 
Analysis 
 
We recorded and transcribed all interviews, uploading notes into Dedoose, a Web-based 
relational database. We employed a template analysis approach, popular for conducting 
qualitative analysis in health services research. This approach combines content analysis with 
grounded theory, yielding a hybrid inductive-deductive approach to coding and analysis (King 
1998, Waring and Wainwright 2008). The conceptual model used to guide interview question 
development (see Appendix 1, Figure 5) was also employed during codebook development and 
the subsequent structured coding process (MacQueen, McLellan et al. 1998). Our codebook 
included three categories: code definition, inclusion/exclusion criteria, and examples of 
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appropriate use (MacQueen, McLellan et al. 1998). The initial codebook included 22 codes, 
which we expanded to 25 during the coding process.  
To ensure inter-coder reliability, the first author and a research assistant trained to use the 
codebook separately reviewed and coded the first three sets of notes, a common approach to 
ensure a systematic approach to coding while maximizing limited resources (Barbour 2001). 
This process yielded a kappa coefficient of .86, considered “near perfect” according to Landis 
and Koch (1977)’s strength of agreement scale. Using the same coding approach employed to 
code the initial transcript sample, the first author and research assistant coded the remaining 
transcripts. 
Study results 
 
We conducted 14 telephone-based interviews with 18 individuals, including hospice 
medical directors, compliance/operations officers, and executive directors between March and 
May 2016. With the exception of one non-response, all individuals contacted for this study 
agreed to participate. Table 2 provides key respondent characteristics, which we present in 
aggregate to protect anonymity of respondents. 
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Table 2. Respondent characteristics1 
Respondent 
characteristic 
Discharge 
region: Low 
n=4 hospices,  
5 individuals 
Discharge 
region: Medium 
n=6 hospices,  
9 individuals 
Discharge 
region: High 
n=4 hospices,  
4 individuals 
Total 
n=14 hospices,  
18 individuals 
Individual characteristics (n=18 individuals) 
Interviewee title/role     
 
Medical director 4 4 1 9 
Director of 
nursing/nurse 
specialist 
0 1 1 2 
Executive 
director/President 0 3 1 4 
Other 1 1 1 3 
Years at current hospice 
0-1 years 0 0  1 1 
2-4 years 1 3 1 5 
5-plus years 4 5 2 11 
Missing N/A 1 N/A 1 
Hospice characteristics (n=14 hospices) 
Type     
 
For-profit 0 3 2 5 
Non-profit 4 3 2 9 
National chain     
Yes 0 3 0 3 
No 4 3 4 11 
Size2     
Small  1 1 2 4 
Medium 0 2 1 3 
Large 2 2 1 5 
X-Large 1 1 0 2 
Region3     
Northeast 1 0 0 1 
South 1 3 2 6 
Midwest 2 2 0 4 
West 0 1 2 3 
Ownership of freestanding inpatient unit 
Yes 2 4 2 8 
No 2 2 2 6 
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1To the extent possible, we tried to recruit a diversity of respondents across discharge tertiles. Based on Teno et 
al.’s 2014 study (10), we defined states with high rates of discharge as those with a live discharge rate greater than 
19.7 percent of all discharges; states with medium rates of discharge included those between 14.4 and 19.6 percent; 
states with low discharge rates represented those at or below 14.3 percent. Thirteen states nationally fall into the 
low tertile, 26 fall into the medium tertile, and 11 are in the high tertile. 
2Hospice size defined as the average daily census, as estimated by interviewees (small = 150 or fewer patients, 
medium =151-500 patients, large= 501-1499 patients, x-large= 1500+ patients) 
3We obtained a diversity of regional responses for each discharge tertile to the extent possible; in some cases, there 
were not states in certain regions that fit into a certain tertile.  
 
 
Analysis generated four themes: 1) difficulty estimating patient prognosis on admission, 
2) increased CMS oversight, 3) rising market competition, and 4) challenges with inpatient 
contracting. Interviewees also provided suggestions regarding ways the system could be 
improved. We did not find any trends in responses based on our segmented groups of state-level 
discharge rate tertiles, nor did we ascertain any trends by hospice size, rurality, region, profit 
status, or corporate ownership. Perspectives varied based on the number of hospices operating in 
a particular market area (see Rising Market Competition section for details).  
Difficulty with prognostication 
 
Across interviews, respondents explained that live discharges ought to be viewed as a 
function of a hospice’s admissions process. Interviewees emphasized that hospices with higher 
rates of live discharge are likely less conservative in their approach to patient admissions, taking 
on patients who are either marginally appropriate for hospice or altogether ineligible, based on 
CMS regulatory stipulations that hospice patients be within six months of death. As such, many 
hypothesized that the rate of live discharge has been increasing because more hospices have been 
admitting inappropriate patients (see Rising Market Competition section for details), resulting, 
ultimately, in a discharge: 
“Every year, the number of people that hospices admit that are not appropriate gets higher and 
higher, and then the number of patients that they subsequently have to discharge gets higher and 
higher for that same reason. So it's really just an overall look at how hospices admitted patients 
to begin with.” 
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Respondents explained, though, that determining eligibility is more of an art than a 
science: Even the most experienced hospice provider often struggles to predict whether a patient 
will die within six months. This issue has become particularly pronounced in the last decade as 
more hospices have taken on non-cancer patients — particularly those with dementia — whose 
disease trajectory is oftentimes challenging, if not impossible, to predict: 
“The bottom line is that we're bad at it [prognostication], and especially when we start looking 
further out. It's one thing to say the patient is actively dying and is going to die within the next 
couple of days; it's another thing to say they have six months, a year, or two years.” 
 
At times, interviewees said, hospices can be a victim of their own good care, as quality 
hospice service delivery can stabilize a declining patient and extend life. In such instances, 
providers often have no choice but to discharge these patients, which oftentimes results in a 
quick decline, as these individuals no longer have access to the hospice care that had initially 
slowed their functional decline or reduced symptom distress. 
On the other hand, many interviewees suggested that some hospices in their markets have 
been taking advantage of the ambiguity of prognostication and Medicare’s per diem 
reimbursement. Although interviewees said that, according to CMS stipulations, patient 
stabilization should result in a near-immediate discharge, they explained that some of their 
counterparts use the first hospice certification period of 90 days to determine eligibility. And in 
some cases, once a patient is admitted, that patient will remain on hospice until death, regardless 
of stabilization in health status: 
“When I first came here [to this hospice] and I started talking about, ‘now you need to discharge 
that person who has been on service for two years, they're not dying within six months,’ … they 
rarely discharged the patient. Once they were on service, they just took care of them until they 
died, regardless of whether that was two years, three years, four years.” 
 
  50 
Increased CMS oversight 
 
Across the board, respondents attributed the rise in live discharge rates over the last 10 to 
15 years to more stringent CMS auditing — referred to by some as adversarial in nature. 
Interviewees described an industry fraught with fear and uncertainty, in which the previous “let’s 
wait and see” attitude has been supplanted by a predisposition to discharge patients to avoid 
having to reimburse CMS millions of dollars for failed audits, which CMS and its contractors 
perform pre- and post-payment through medical reviews of hospice claims.22 
Particularly for smaller hospices operating with narrow margins or organizations serving 
as the sole hospice provider in a rural area, the next CMS audit could be the difference between 
staying afloat or going out of business. In such instances, respondents explained, taking a risk on 
a patient’s borderline eligibility is often not worth the potential costs: 
“That's a great concern for us, and it's not written anywhere that that's driving our live 
discharge policy, but I think it's reasonable to think that … in addition to wanting to do the right 
thing, we also, we don't want to be either accused or found guilty of milking the system.” 
 
Some respondents recognized that the increased scrutiny has in part stemmed from 
CMS’s desire to curb the rise in extremely long stays. Others suggested that CMS has focused on 
the tendency of some hospices to reap the financial benefits of keeping patients on hospice 
longer, particularly those who are relatively stable with less costly conditions, such as dementia. 
In the end, though, providers across the country described negative interactions with either their 
Medicare Fiscal Intermediary, who carries out pre-payment reviews, or the contractors 
                                                
22Hospice Fiscal Intermediaries (FIs) or Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) primarily carry out pre-
payment reviews to probe on service-, provider-, beneficiary-, or diagnosis-specific inquiries. On the post-payment 
side, FIs and MACs primarily rely on Recovery Auditor Contractors (RACs), as well as Zone Program Integrity 
Contractors (ZPICs) and Program Safeguard Contractors (PSCs), to reconcile past improper payments. 
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responsible for post-payment audits (e.g., Recovery Auditory Contractors (RACs), Zone 
Program Integrity Contractors (ZPICs)): 
“CMS – and our Fiscal Intermediary — was putting on so much pressure that we not keep these 
patients long because of ADRs [Additional Development Requests] and then having to pay 
money back that a real chill set in for hospice providers. And so keeping patients too long was 
no longer okay. And we even said, ‘now wait a minute, if we look at some of the studies that have 
been done, hospice actually saves the system money instead of spending all that money end of 
life in a hospital.’ And he [the Fiscal Intermediary] said, ‘well, you would think that we would 
care about that, but we really don't. Because all I'm tasked to do is look at part of the pie called 
hospice, and our costs are going up, and therefore we're going to be looking only at the hospice.’ 
And so whereas we would have felt more comfortable keeping people longer amounts of time, he 
was very clear with us in 2013 that we need to, you know, really be careful.” 
 
In particular, providers said recovery auditors have an incentive to find areas of non-
compliance, as CMS reimburses them according to a contingency fee, representing a percentage 
of the dollar value associated with each improper over- and under-payment they correct 
(December 2012). Given the constant ambiguity associated with prognostication, many 
respondents said that these auditors often do not have the clinical expertise necessary to override 
judgments of hospice clinical directors, despite their requirement that staff incorporate nurses, 
therapists, and physicians. Interviewees described feelings of helplessness and defensiveness 
associated with their clinical decision-making: 
“With these RACs and ZPICs, I mean, they literally come in like bounty hunters and just pull 
everything out of the drawers and throw it all on the floor and sniff around until they find 
something valuable. And it's completely, it is very adversarial. It's very hostile, and they have a 
tremendous incentive to find something. So I think just our fear of such audits is much greater 
than our fear of a fiscal intermediary review 10 years ago would have been.” 
 
“There's also this requirement that each patient, their recertification has to have a face-to-face 
encounter by either a nurse practitioner or physician. And what was crazy that we were noticing 
— especially during this time — is it didn't matter what that professional said. They have 
reviewers sitting somewhere in Iowa going, ‘Nope. Nope.’ … If you're not going to listen to the 
professional who has gone out to see the patient and is doing this unreimbursed visit … then why 
mandate that we have to have someone full-time on our staff to go do these face-to-face visits?” 
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“Medicare creates its own creatures: They put in all these ZPICs and everything else to audit 
charts, and they willy-nilly deny care based on nothing concrete, and so hospices are … not 
going to hang on to patients as long.” 
Rising market competition and hospice business practices 
 
In conjunction with the increase in CMS oversight during the last 10 to 15 years, 
respondents in many regions of the country described a boom in the number of hospices 
operating within a given geographic area, which they said has created a culture of “competition.” 
One provider estimated her market area has upwards of 80 hospices, while a number of others 
came in just under that figure, with 50, 60, or 70 hospices. Interviewees explained that areas that 
used to be defined by friendly collaboration across hospices have experienced extreme 
transformations — prompting one respondent to call the hospice industry the “Wild, Wild West” 
and another to refer to hospice service delivery as “hand-to-hand combat.”  
Synthesis of responses across interviews revealed that the surge in competition across 
some markets has directly affected hospice admission and discharge patterns through four inter-
related means: 1) inappropriate admissions and subsequent discharges, 2) discharged patients 
being immediately admitted by another hospice only to be discharged again, 3) aggressive 
marketing to patients and providers that subsequently encourages patients shifting across 
hospices, and 4) desire/perceived need to “keep up” with competitors through all of the 
aforementioned tactics. Notably, the four participants who estimated their markets have fewer 
than 10 hospices said they had only read or heard about these trends — they had not experienced 
them first-hand with any frequency, if at all, within their markets.  
In more saturated markets, interviewees said that patients who would otherwise not be 
admitted to hospice are receiving care: 
“When you have a market that's this saturated, it breeds temptation to admit inappropriate 
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patients.” 
 
In such instances, some hospices — many of them for-profit — have created “demand” by 
targeting more marginal patients, particularly those who are likely to be more lucrative (i.e., less 
costly, longer length-of-stay patients). Interviewees described providers selectively admitting 
nursing home patients in particular. Such business practices, several respondents noted, have 
resulted in providers coming close to their aggregate caps;23 one provider said this phenomenon 
spurs hospices to “patient-dump in mass numbers” at the end of the cap year.  
Providers also said that in these saturated markets, when they discharged a patient 
because they clinically assessed the patient to be ineligible for hospice, other hospices in the area 
immediately admitted the patient — a practice, some interviewees guessed, CMS has not yet 
tracked. Oftentimes, families of the discharged patient call other hospices in the service area: 
“We would discharge somebody after… agonizing over whether it was the right thing to do, and 
then our for-profit competitors would come in and swoop them up and just bring them on 
service… so we agonize, we give the family the message and then — boop — because we have 30 
other competitors … [the patient’s family members] just call for-profits and it's just, ‘yep no 
problem, I'll pick them up.’” 
 
“It almost became a little game, almost like … catching fish that are not big enough to qualify as 
keepers, and then you keep throwing them back and catching them again.” 
 
In some markets, hospices have also started marketing their services to patients and 
providers, encouraging patients to switch providers and offering physicians payments for 
referring patients who are typically more lucrative to the hospice. Some of these activities have 
been more discreet, with hospices making themselves “easy” to work with, promising to always 
                                                
23The aggregate cap restricts total payments hospices receive per patient from Medicare and requires them to repay 
CMS any total payments in excess of the cap amount times the number of Medicare beneficiaries served during a 
12-month period. 
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admit referred patients, for example. Other times, the marketing is more blatant: One respondent 
described a practice called “charting,” in which hospices review patient records in nursing homes 
and guarantee the nursing homes that a certain proportion of patients (e.g., 60 percent) will 
qualify for a hospice referral. Another mentioned a local attorney who has been encouraging 
nursing homes in the region to open their own hospices, to which the nursing homes can funnel 
referrals: 
“They're [certain for-profit hospices in the area] inducing referrals more than likely. And we've 
had them talk … to our families in the long-term care or assisted living world, and the daughter 
is like, ‘I'm sorry, they made me change, otherwise, not only would my dad not be able to get 
care, but my mom lives here too. And they said I'd have to find another assisted living program if 
I didn't choose [name of hospice redacted]. And I have no issues with you guys, I love you guys.’ 
We're like, ‘oh my gosh.’ So guess what? There must be a big margin to be made, right?” 
 
 “When I worked in smaller hospices … when we had a census of 50, if a group home who 
referred a patient to us, and we went out there, we admitted them almost 100 percent of the time, 
whether they met criteria or not.” 
 
As a byproduct of some of these selective marketing/admission practices, interviewees 
explained that their hospices are now often responsible for taking care of a disproportionate share 
of the higher acuity, complicated, and, thus, more costly patients. 
Still, the temptation to engage in such financially oriented activities is high in some areas, 
as hospices fear the loss of business if they don’t “keep up” with competitors. One provider 
described a number of conversations she had previously engaged in with members of her 
organization who had been encouraging such practices. She said that these individuals believed 
that stopping such activities could harm business:  
“If we became the most restrictive hospice to work with, then all the business is going to go 
elsewhere, because hospitals and physician offices are going to refer down the path of least 
resistance.” 
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Challenges with inpatient contracting 
 
Beyond the challenges of operating within what interviewees described as competitive 
markets and an industry plagued by fear and uncertainty, a handful of providers discussed issues 
they have experienced contracting with local area hospitals to provide general inpatient care 
(GIP) to their patients. Interviewees attributed some of their live discharges to scenarios in which 
patients needed inpatient services and the hospice was unable to provide GIP due to the absence 
of a contract — which, these respondents explained, was not for lack of trying: 
“A lot of patients that go into a hospital, we would love to follow them in any hospital, but, like 
[hospital name redacted], they won't sign a contract with us, even a one-time contract per 
patient, so we can follow that patient, so there's no choice given [but to discharge]… I think with 
them it's because they have their own hospice, and so you know, it's that competition. … And I 
know CMS is thinking that, … they [hospices] just don't want to pay for it [GIP], and that's not 
always the case.” 
 
“There is one hospital particularly that won't contract with us despite years of discussions with 
them. …We've heard different reasons, but, basically, the finance people in the hospital don't get 
why they would do it.” 
 
Solutions  
 
Given the many barriers providers discussed, we also asked them to brainstorm some 
solutions CMS could consider moving forward. Among the most frequently discussed topics was 
CMS oversight, which interviewees suggested requires a more targeted approach directed 
exclusively at the “bad actors.” Respondents suggested that a more nuanced method of oversight 
would not only avoid victimizing the hospices trying to deliver high-quality care but would also 
yield a more streamlined crackdown on the plethora of inappropriate activities plaguing the 
industry:  
“CMS knows who the bad actors are. They can tell statistically from things like we're talking 
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about, … where they should be focusing their efforts. But instead of doing that, they're going 
after everybody in the same manner. We don't know why that is but it's frustrating.” 
 
“I might also follow the live discharges if I were them [CMS]. You know, take a random 
sampling of a hospice that has a live discharge rate and follow — or any live discharges — do a 
study. Like we said, if we're discharging, we feel like we really gave them [patients] every 
opportunity, and if another hospice is picking them up the next day and starting billing, follow 
that — follow the money and say, ‘hmm, how could one hospice say no and another say yes?’” 
 
Interviewees also suggested CMS: 1) eliminate what providers described as the perverse 
incentive for recovery auditors to find issues with hospice admission decisions and 2) require 
hospice accreditation (e.g., The Joint Commission on Accreditation for Healthcare), which 
would yield a more standardized form of oversight.  
Discussions about potential revisions to the hospice benefit were more mixed, with some 
respondents suggesting the six-month eligibility criterion is a “vestige of a different time” and 
should be extended to at least a year and others indicating that it still works fine. A couple 
respondents said they are interested in results from the Medicare Care Choices Model currently 
underway to test the effect of allowing patients to receive hospice-like services while obtaining 
curative treatments. Those who discussed the new payment change released under the FY 2016 
Hospice Wage Index and Payment Rate Update, which altered routine home care payments 
starting Jan. 1, 2016, to reflect the beneficiaries’ length of stay, said that CMS “got it right” — 
although others warned caution, with one respondent noting he had already started seeing 
hospices discharging patients around day 60. 
Other reimbursement-related solutions ranged from discussions around implementing a 
medical home-like model, in which the hospice provider would be responsible for coordinating 
all services rendered, to reimbursing at different rates based on the setting of care (e.g., a lower 
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rate in nursing homes because it is less costly to provide care in that setting). Others also 
suggested moving hospice toward a shared savings/value-based payment model: 
“If I worked for CMS … I might say if you manage to keep your GIP rate at two percent or less 
or three percent or less, you're going to share in some of the savings or you're going to get a 
bonus payment … I might take the emphasis off the live discharges and start rewarding hospices 
that are able to keep people in the home and do it in routine care … with no re-hospitalization.” 
 
Finally, a couple respondents discussed a glitch in the system, in which declining patients 
receiving hospice care at home are hospitalized (due to a fall, for example) and, instead of being 
eventually sent home on their hospice care, are discharged to a nursing home for short-term 
skilled care. Interviewees said that this trend often occurs because the family can no longer care 
for the patient at home — and Medicare covers room and board in a nursing home for up to 100 
days while the patient meets the skilled care criterion. 
“I would love to see some kind of a mandate for nursing homes that if the patient qualifies for 
hospice care, they’re not eligible for those Part A days … for really good-quality hospice 
programs, we’re seeing live discharges for that reason, and it makes my heart sick because, like 
this man this morning [with metastatic cancer in six places], he needs us in there to be managing 
pain, symptoms. … But the family is saying, ‘please order this for us, you’ve been our doctor for 
20 years and this helps us financially, you know, because it will pay for the nursing home bill 
and we can’t manage the care at home.’” 
 
Discussion 
 
This study sought to expand the evidence base regarding provider perspectives on the 
factors increasing the rate of live discharge from hospice during the last decade. Given CMS’ 
increasing scrutiny of hospice quality and costs over the last several years and, more specifically, 
its consideration of adopting live discharge rates as a claims-based quality indicator (MedPAC 
March 2015), this study provides significant contributions to the existing knowledge about 
hospice enrollment and disenrollment patterns from the provider perspective. 
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Participants emphasized the challenges underlying each decision to live discharge. Even 
for seasoned providers seeking to conscientiously follow CMS admission and discharge 
guidelines, assessments of prognosis are frequently shrouded in uncertainty, thus obscuring the 
line between “appropriate” and “inappropriate” admissions as well as discharges. Given the 
complexities and competing priorities providers face — to the patient’s welfare and to CMS 
guidelines — the results from this study indicate that CMS should exercise caution before using 
live discharge rates as a measure of quality across hospices. At the very least, CMS should first 
evaluate the effect of audits on hospice discharge patterns and better understand the scenarios in 
which this outcome is appropriate. Live discharges driven by patient stabilization and life 
prolongation due to hospice care, as well as those simply due to a change in patient preferences, 
can be considered high-quality care. As the system stands, the interrelated factors that together 
yield a hospice’s rate of live discharge, would make it difficult to set a reasonable threshold or 
range indicating “good” quality.  
Still, respondents discussed certain scenarios in which financially motivated behaviors 
have resulted in clearly inappropriate enrollment and disenrollment practices — and may be 
prominent contributing factors in the rising and varying rate nationally. Providers spoke of these 
trends in black-and-white terms, implicitly drawing a line between discharges that occur as a 
result of the ambiguity of patient prognosis and those that occur as a profit-maximization 
strategy. Indeed, until CMS released its FY 2016 Payment Rate Update, the agency had been 
paying hospice providers a flat daily rate for each enrollee, regardless of services rendered and 
length of time enrolled. This payment structure encouraged hospices to select certain patients 
who typically have longer lengths of stay, as hospice stays are often more expensive at the 
beginning and end of the episode of care. As such, respondents emphasized that discharges 
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initiated to maximize profits rather than due to clinical uncertainty ought to be deemed 
“inappropriate,” more effectively tracked, and eliminated at their root. A related implication is 
that patient deaths shortly after hospice discharge may suggest a pattern of avoidance of higher 
service costs during active dying. 
It is possible that passage of the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation 
Act in 2014, which mandates hospices be certified at least every three years, compared to the 
previous six-year requirement, could solve some of these issues (CMS May 2015), but only if 
these audits are carried out with a full understanding of the complexities of delivering hospice 
care. As respondents noted, the ability of CMS oversight to support high-quality providers 
depends on the way in which the agency implements those audits. 
Delving into the intricacies of provider discharge decisions, this study also scratched the 
surface on larger issues facing the hospice industry as it continues to expand its national 
visibility and reach. Interviewees described an industry that has perhaps become overwhelmed 
by a surge in the number of hospices across many markets and one also operating within the 
confines of a benefit structure initially catering to cancer patients’ disease trajectories. The 
changing profile of the hospice patient — one with a more prognostically ambiguous non-cancer 
disease — and the increasing demand for services suggests that the six-month benefit criterion 
could be critically reviewed to ensure the program structure appropriately caters to the patient 
population it now serves. The fact that respondents across the board described an industry so 
susceptible to negative market pressures — leading one interviewee to admit to already seeing 
shifts in the way hospices are gaming the system based on the payment change — emphasizes 
that the industry may require a holistic overhaul rather than tweaks to reimbursement. 
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Despite the dire reality the plurality of participants described, trends expressed in this 
study do not point to a wholly corrupt industry. Quite the contrary: The participants in this study 
implicitly revealed that in spite of the challenges the industry is facing, passionate individuals 
continue to deliver care to patients and their families during a difficult time in life. These are the 
providers that would benefit from a serious examination into ways end-of-life care delivery 
mechanisms can be improved. 
Limitations 
 
This study had a few limitations. First, due to its qualitative nature, the work relied on a 
purposive sample of interviews with hospice providers across the country. Although this 
approach is commonly employed in qualitative research, it is also inherently limited: The 
responses of a group of selected interviewees may not be representative of larger perspectives 
across the country. Our approach to geographic sampling and the selection of interviewees from 
various hospice types attempted to maximize generalizability. And the speed with which we 
reached theme saturation suggests there may be limited variation in experiences among 
participants.  
Second, the data used in this study were based on interviewee perceptions and 
experiences, which are subject to personal biases. Still, due to the commonalities across 
interviews, we believe the results of this study reflect some of the realities currently challenging 
providers across the country.  
Finally, due to our sampling approach, we likely did not speak with any of the truly “bad 
actors” discussed previously; it is not possible to know whether this sample reflects the larger 
industry. The sample was skewed toward hospices that have been in operation for more than a 
decade, which tend to have lower live discharge rates (Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). Some 
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participants shared their rates of live discharge during the discussions and had rates well below 
the national average. 
Conclusion 
 
This exploratory qualitative work points to a number of considerations associated with 
live discharges from hospice that ought to be investigated in further detail and which could 
ultimately lend insight to necessary policy and regulatory changes. More specifically, the 
industry could further benefit from studies that systematically clarify inappropriate enrollment 
and disenrollment considerations — both through additional primary data collection 
(encompassing viewpoints of patients, providers, and regulators) as well as more targeted 
secondary analyses. Such studies could explore some of the relationships highlighted here, such 
as the association between market competition and admission/live discharge rates, patterns of 
patient disenrollment from one hospice and immediate admission to another, and movement of 
patients from hospice to the hospital and into skilled nursing facilities.
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CHAPTER THREE: AIM 2 STUDY 
Do hospice profitability and live discharge rates go hand-in-hand? 
 
For more than a decade, the rate of live discharge from hospice increased steadily in the 
United States, from a median of 13.7 percent in 2000 to 19.4 percent in 2013, before dipping 
slightly to 18.7 percent in 2014 (MedPAC March 2016, Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014). 
While changes in patient preferences, health status, and/or prognosis inevitably lead to some 
highly appropriate live discharges, the consistent uptick in national rates — as well as 
considerable variations across hospice types and markets — has raised concerns among federal 
regulators that other provider factors contribute to this trend.  Particularly high rates of live 
discharge may indicate poor quality, as studies show that individuals discharged alive from 
hospice are more likely to be hospitalized, admitted to an emergency department, or admitted to 
the intensive care unit than those who remain continuously enrolled in hospice until death 
(Taylor, Steinhauser et al. 2008, Carlson, Herrin et al. 2010, Unroe, Greiner et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, in 2016, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) warned, “an 
unusually high rate of live discharges could indicate that a hospice provider is not meeting the 
needs of patients and families or is admitting patients who do not meet the eligibility criteria” 
(MedPAC March 2016). 
Live discharges from hospice can occur for a variety of reasons — because the patient 
revoked the benefit, because patient prognosis changed and the provider determined the patient 
was no longer eligible for hospice under Medicare guidelines, or because the patient moved from 
the hospice service area, among others. MedPAC’s 2016 Report to Congress found that for 39
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percent of live discharges, patients indicated willingness to revoke hospice, while the remainder 
were entirely provider-initiated, primarily because the hospice physician deemed the patient no 
longer terminally ill (MedPAC March 2016). While many discharges are likely reflective of 
good quality — for example, the patient stabilized and his/her prognosis exceeded six months — 
regulators have expressed concern that some hospices are incorporating financial considerations 
in these patient care decisions. In a Proposed Rule the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) published in the Federal Register in May 2015, the agency stated: “We are concerned that 
some hospices are making determinations of hospice coverage based solely on cost and 
reimbursement as opposed to being based on patient-centered needs, preferences and goals for 
those approaching the end of life” (CMS May 2015). 
   Recent qualitative work identified several financial factors that might motivate a hospice 
to discharge a patient prior to death: 1) the patient required inpatient hospice care, and the 
hospice did not have a contract with a local inpatient facility through which it could provide 
general inpatient care because at least one party did not find a contract to be financially 
beneficial; 2) the hospice was approaching its aggregate cap — a limit on the total payments 
hospices receive per patient from Medicare during a 12-month period — and did not want to 
provide services that would require repayment penalties to CMS; and 3) the hospice feared 
repercussions from more stringent CMS audits, resulting in the discharge of patients who 
appeared to be marginally eligible for the hospice benefit, based on the CMS six-month 
prognostication criterion (Dolin, Hanson et al.). Indeed, existing empirical studies provide some 
evidence of such relationships, revealing associations between newer (fewer than five years since 
receiving Medicare certification) for-profit hospices that exceeded their aggregate 
reimbursement caps and high live discharge rates (Aldridge, Schlesinger et al. 2014, Plotzke, 
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Christian et al. May 2014). In theory, hospices might also discharge higher acuity, more 
complicated patients because they tend to be more costly to the hospice. 
The totality of evidence in the literature emphasizes that more information is needed 
regarding the relationship between potential profit-maximization strategies on the part of some 
hospices and rates of live discharge. While a stable financial model is necessary for all hospice 
organizations, an association between profit margins and live discharge rates could indicate 
profit rather than financial stability as a determinant of discharge practices. Accordingly, this 
study aimed to explore whether hospice financial margins have a positive association with rates 
of live discharge from hospice. We hypothesized that some hospices may operate in a 
particularly business-minded manner, and because live discharges may at times be financially 
beneficial to hospices, providers with higher margins might also discharge patients at higher 
rates.  
Study data and methods 
Conceptual model 
The research question and hypothesis for this study emerged from a conceptual model 
(Donabedian 1966) that depicts the range of structural/environmental and patient care/process-
oriented factors that ultimately result in the outcome of interest: live discharge from hospice (see 
Appendix 1, Figure 5). As the model shows, live discharges can be either patient- or provider-
initiated. This study focuses on provider-initiated drivers and, specifically, the relationship 
between hospice-based financial factors and live discharge as an outcome. We use hospice-level 
profit margin as a proxy for how organizational financial concerns may influence a patient-level 
discharge decision.  
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Data 
Data for this study came from two sources: Medicare hospice cost reports and claims 
(Provider of Services file, the Hospice Research Identifiable File, and the Master Beneficiary 
Summary File). Cost report data, which are publicly available through the CMS Healthcare Cost 
Report Information System, were pulled for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 (form CMS-1984-
99). Because the literature shows that freestanding hospices operate differently from co-located 
hospices (e.g., hospital- or home health-based), particularly with regard to their margin, we 
included only freestanding hospices in this analysis (MedPAC March 2016). In 2013, 
freestanding facilities represented 72 percent of all hospices (MedPAC March 2016).  
We used 100 percent Medicare hospice claims from 2012 and 2013 to construct a 
hospice-year file with two observations for each hospice (i.e., 2012 and 2013). Due to data use 
agreement restrictions, hospices with fewer than 10 observed discharges (either alive or 
deceased) were excluded; these missing live discharge values accounted for 11 percent of total 
discharges in the dataset. Prior studies indicate that this approach may understate the average 
hospice-level rate of live discharge, making our live discharge rate more conservative (Carlson, 
Herrin et al. 2009, Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). Beneficiaries missing a count identifying the 
certification period of their stay in hospice (e.g., first 90-day days, second 90 days, etc.) (n=554) 
were deleted from the claims file.  
To ensure beneficiaries in the study had no hospice stay in the previous 90 days, we 
implemented a washout period representing the first 90 days of 2012. As a result of this 
approach, beneficiaries enrolled in hospice in January, February, or March, 2012, were 
eliminated from the file (n=514,038), ensuring our dataset represented only those beginning a 
new stay on or after April 1, 2012. Although it is possible these beneficiaries could have 
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experienced a hospice stay prior to 2012, that prior stay would have been non-continuous for 
those individuals to remain in the file. Still, the 21 months of data (April 2012-December 2013) 
included in this data file is sufficient to capture the range of patient experiences, on average – 
allowing for both short and longer stays – given that the median length of stay in 2013 was 17 
days (mean of 87.8 days) (MedPAC March 2016). Because this approach eliminated extreme 
outlier stays, the facility-level live discharge rates calculated for this study are likely 
conservative. 
To account for varying hospice fiscal years in the cost report data, 2013 observations 
came from the 2012 and 2013 cost reports, representing hospice-level observations for the fiscal 
year that closed during the 2013 aggregate cap year (Nov. 1, 2012 to Oct. 31, 2013); see 
Appendix 2, Figure 6, for a graphical depiction of this approach. Likewise, 2012 observations 
came from the 2011 and 2012 cost reports (Appendix 2, Figure 7), representing the fiscal year 
that closed during the 2012 cap year (Nov. 1, 2011 to Oct. 31, 2012). We opted for this approach 
to account for potential strategic timing in discharge patterns, as studies point to a relationship 
between discharges and a given hospice’s percentage of its cap attained, which inherently 
increases as hospices approach the end of the cap year on Oct. 31 (Plotzke, Christian et al. 2015, 
Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014). Because our key explanatory variable — hospice margin — 
varies by the length of time, we dropped hospices with a fiscal year less than 364 days in the cost 
reports (n=395 across the two years of data). 
We linked all files by hospice provider number to create a single hospice-year analytic 
file. During this process, 19 hospices were dropped when merging the POS data on to the cost 
reports, while 16 were lost when merging claims on to the POS/cost report file.   
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Key variables 
This study uses both total and operating margins, two of the most common measures of 
profitability, as its key explanatory variables. We created total margin and operating margin 
variables using Worksheet G2, Parts I and II, from the hospice cost reports. Operating margin 
was calculated as operating revenues minus operating expenses, divided by operating revenues; 
total margin was defined as total revenue minus total expenses, divided by total revenue (see 
Appendix 4, Exhibit 1, for full equations). Non-operating revenue and expenses used in the total 
margin calculation were approximated from the total deductions and state Medicaid room & 
board (non-operating revenue) lines and total additions (non-operating expenses) line in the cost 
reports.  
For this analysis, operating margin is more relevant because it reflects profitability from 
patient care operations, whereas total margin includes non-operating revenue, such as charitable 
contributions and investment income. However, both measures are used because of variation in 
reporting of operating and non-operating revenues and expenses in Medicare cost reports. Due to 
extreme outliers in both measures, we excluded observations with a margin greater than 50 
percent or less than -50 percent from the analysis, representing fewer than five percent of 
observations at the upper and lower ends for both total and operating margin variables (Holmes, 
Kaufman et al. 2016).  
The outcome for this study was the hospice-year rate of live discharge as a percentage of 
all discharges in 2012 and 2013, measured as the number of total live discharges in 2012 and 
2013 divided by the number of total discharges (including decedents). Individuals who continued 
in hospice during the study period were excluded from the discharge rate numerator and 
denominator, as their discharge status had not yet been determined. We ascertained patient status 
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(i.e., discharged dead, discharged alive, still a patient) from the patient status code on the last 
beneficiary claim for each calendar year of data.  
For purposes of unadjusted analyses, we created a variable representing three discharge 
tertiles, based on the rate of live discharge. Hospices in the “low” live discharge rate group 
included those with a rate at or below eight percent, those defined as “medium” had a rate greater 
than eight percent and less than 13.5 percent, and those in the “high” group had a live discharge 
rate greater than or equal to 13.5 percent.  
Analysis 
 
We estimated multiple regression models with hospice random effects and state-level 
clustering to test the association between hospice total/operating margins (explanatory variable) 
and rates of live discharge (outcome), adjusting for a number of covariates, including: log of 
total discharges, year, ownership type, chain status, urban/rural location, region, proportion of 
patients who were White, proportion of patients who were female, and mean age. We ran 
alternative models with an interaction of ownership type and total/operating margins, under the 
hypothesis that margins vary by hospice ownership type. We also ran several sensitivity 
analyses: First we restricted the model to hospices with 100 or more total discharges to account 
for the possibility of left-censoring (i.e., driven by unknown values for hospices with fewer than 
10 discharges); second, to address potential year-to-year variation based on hospice size, we ran 
two pooled models, one weighted by total discharges and another without weights; and, third, we 
controlled for the percentage of patients with a primary diagnosis of failure to thrive and debility 
non-specified. This final model attempted to address potential patient selection by certain 
hospices with a high rate of patients with ill-defined conditions, who tend to have longer lengths 
of stay than those with cancer diagnoses (116 days compared to 53 days in 2013) (MedPAC 
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March 2015). We additionally ran hospice fixed effects models to compare estimates with the 
random effects models and determined the fixed effects estimates to be highly variable and 
inefficient due to the limited within-hospice variation among key variables and the short panel 
(T=2); for a more thorough explanation of why we chose random effects over fixed effects, see 
Appendix 5, Exhibit 2. 
Study results 
 
Our sample included a total of 1439 distinct freestanding hospices, which ranged in 
average live discharge rate (2012-2013) from 1.8 to 82.7 percent, with a mean of 13.4 percent 
and a median of 10.2 percent. Table 3 shows key descriptive characteristics for the entire sample 
and grouped according to average facility discharge rates — low (<=8 percent), medium (>8 
percent and <13.5 percent), and high (>=13.5 percent) — during 2012 and 2013. The average 
total margin across hospices was 12.2 percent, while the average operating margin was 6.9 
percent. Overall, on average, the patient population across freestanding facilities was 58.3 
percent female and 88.7 percent White, with a mean age of 81.6. Furthermore, the largest 
proportion of freestanding hospices in 2012 and 2013 were for-profit (65.9 percent), chain-
owned (55.9 percent), operating in urban areas (84.7 percent), and located in the South (46.2 
percent).  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, 2012-13, distribution of hospice characteristics by discharge 
group tertile 
  Low  
(<=8%) 
Medium 
 
(>8% and <13.5%) 
High 
 
(>=13.5%) Total 
n 820 789 807 2416 
Hospice patient characteristics     
Total margins 11.5% 12.6% 12.6% 12.2% 
Operating margins 4.2% 6.6% 11.1% 6.9% 
Mean age 81.5 81.9 81.2 81.6 
% White 91.1% 90.9% 82.0% 88.7% 
% Black 7.7% 8.7% 19.4% 10.6% 
% Hispanic 3.2% 5.1% 17.0% 5.2% 
% Female 57.6% 58.7% 59.0% 58.3% 
% Failure to Thrive, primary diagnosis 5.0% 6.5% 8.7% 6.4% 
% Debility non-specified, primary 
diagnosis 7.3% 9.2% 11.7% 9.0% 
Median length of stay (days) 46.5 61.8 82 62.2 
Median years in operation 19.5 11.8 7.3 11.4 
     
Hospice ownership type     
For-profit 46.8% 67.8% 83.6% 65.9% 
Non-profit/Gov. 43.4% 23.1% 11.2% 26.1% 
Other 9.8% 9.1% 5.3% 8.1% 
     Hospice chain ownership     
Non-chain 50.8% 39.4% 41.9% 44.1% 
Chain 49.2% 60.6% 58.1% 55.9% 
     Rural     
Urban 88.0% 84.5% 81.3% 84.7% 
Rural 12.0% 15.5% 18.7% 15.3% 
     Region     
Midwest 27.6% 20.0% 13.1% 20.4% 
Northeast 12.9% 15.3% 8.1% 12.2% 
South 42.0% 40.5% 56.8% 46.2% 
West 17.6% 24.3% 22.0% 21.2% 
 
 
Nearly all hospice characteristics were statistically different (p<0.05) across the three 
discharge rate tertiles. Average operating margin was higher for the group of hospices with high 
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discharge rates (11.1 percent) compared to those with low (4.2 percent) and medium (6.6 
percent) rates. Consistent with expectations, total margin exhibited less of a trend, with hospices 
in the medium group and those in the high group having the same total margin — nearly 13 
percent — on average; total margin was the only variable that was not statistically different 
across the discharge tertiles (p=0.596). 
In terms of patient characteristics, hospices with higher rates of live discharge had much 
larger proportions of Black enrollees (19.4 percent on average) compared to facilities with low 
(7.7 percent) and medium (8.7 percent) rates. Similarly, hospices in the high discharge tertile had 
higher median rates of patients with primary diagnoses of failure to thrive and debility non-
specified, compared to their medium and low discharge counterparts; these hospices with higher 
live discharge rates also had higher average lengths of stay (82.0 days) compared to low (46.5 
days) and medium (61.8 days) groups. They also tended to be newer (7.3 years in operation on 
average) compared to the low and medium discharge tertiles (19.5 and 11.8 years, respectively). 
Among facility characteristics, hospices with higher rates of live discharge showed sharp 
contrasts with hospices in the low tertile: They were more likely to be for-profit (83.6 percent vs. 
46.8 percent), chain-owned (58.1 percent vs. 49.2 percent), operating in a rural area (18.7 percent 
vs. 12.0 percent), and located in the South (56.8 percent vs. 42.0 percent). Hospices in the middle 
tertile were 67.8 percent for-profit, 60.6 percent chain-owned (the highest rate of chain 
ownership across the three tertiles), and 40.5 percent were located in the South. All facility 
characteristics were statistically different across the three groups (p=0.000). 
Figure 2 graphically shows bivariate associations between select hospice characteristics 
(i.e., median proportion White, median years in operation, median length of stay, and median 
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operating margins). These graphs reinforce the trends in Table 3 depicting differences in 
descriptive statistics across the three groups.  
Figure 2. Select descriptive characteristics by discharge tertile, 2012-13 
 
Table 4 compares coefficients for two models with hospice random effects: one with total 
margin as the outcome variable (model 1) and one with operating margin as the outcome variable 
(model 2), both of which are clustered at the state level to adjust for correlated errors among 
hospices operating in the same state. Overall, adjusted analyses showed a positive association 
between total and operating margins and hospice-level rates of live discharge, with statistically 
significant results (p<0.05). In other words, as operating and total margins increase, respectively, 
the expected rate of live discharges increases, holding all else constant. 
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Table 4. Multivariate analysis of live discharge, by hospice characteristics, 2012 and 2013 
  Live discharge rate 
  
(1) 
Total margins 
Clustered, state-level 
(2) 
Operating margins 
Clustered, state-level 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
     Hospice total margins 0.0377* 0.010   
     Hospice operating margins   0.0346** 0.002 
     Log total discharges -0.0530*** 0.000 -0.0532*** 0.000 
     Proportion of White patients -0.155*** 0.000 -0.161*** 0.000 
     Proportion of female patients 0.0556 0.269 0.0506 0.313 
     Hospice mean age -0.00725*** 0.000 -0.00704*** 0.000 
     Hospice years in operation -0.00113** 0.002 -0.00107** 0.003 
     Northeast 0.0178*** 0.000 0.0159** 0.001 
     South -0.000353 0.974 -0.00208 0.851 
     West 0.0158 0.080 0.0140 0.090 
     Rural 0.00558 0.572 0.00819 0.413 
     Non-profit/Gov. -0.00776 0.144 -0.00407 0.398 
     Other -0.00282 0.709 -0.000650 0.934 
     Chain -0.0139*** 0.001 -0.0141** 0.001 
     Analysis year, 2013 0.0394*** 0.000 0.0393*** 0.000 
     Constant 1.100*** 0.000 1.094*** 0.000 
     
   n 2133 2179 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Hospice-level demographic covariates — proportion White and mean age — were 
negatively associated with total and operating margins and statistically significant across the 
models. Among hospice facility characteristics, number of years in operation (negative 
association) and chain ownership status (negative association relative to non-chain status) were 
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statistically significant in the two models. Across geographic regions, only the Northeast was 
statistically different from the Midwest. Coefficients on the interaction effects between facility 
ownership type and total/operating margins were statistically insignificant and not presented in 
Table 4. 
Sensitivity analyses produced similar results, with positive associations between total 
margin and live discharge rates as well as operating margin and live discharge rates (see 
Appendix 3, Table 8 and Table 9 for more information) in the models restricted to hospices with 
at least 100 total discharges (p=0.011 and p=0.000, respectively). Confidence intervals in 
weighted and unweighted pooled analyses appeared generally comparable, suggesting year-to-
year variation based on hospice size was not an issue. Finally, models that controlled for the 
percentage of patients with a primary diagnosis of failure to thrive and debility, non-specified, 
did not yield a statistically significant relationship between operating/total margins and live 
discharges rates; however, these models had a much smaller sample size than other models 
(n=662 vs. n=2100+) due to missing data from suppression of values with fewer than 10 
observations. 
Discussion 
 
Results from this study show a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
higher operating and total margins and higher hospice-level rates of live discharge in 2012 and 
2013. These findings build on the current literature, which highlights associations between 
hospice- and market-level characteristics and rates of live discharge and speculates that factors 
beyond patient preferences may drive discharge decisions. Specifically, as the first study to 
quantitatively explore the relationship between hospice profit margins and rates of live 
discharge, this work provides evidence to substantiate some of that speculation — that some 
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hospice business practices may be driving the decision to live discharge. Ultimately, findings 
from this study have the potential to enhance our understanding of drivers of hospice use — 
beyond patient preferences — and may highlight priority areas for change that could ensure 
higher quality care is provided to patients accessing hospice at the end of life. 
Although the findings presented here align with the literature on this topic to date, they 
further emphasize the existence of a recent trend across sectors of the industry that ought to be 
explored in greater depth by both researchers and federal regulators. Based on the relationships 
highlighted in this study, it is indeed possible that CMS’ concern expressed in its 2015 Proposed 
Rule — that some hospices are making care decisions based on financial reasons rather than 
patient needs — reflects a reality among some hospices. Both adjusted and unadjusted analyses 
show clear differences between hospices with higher and lower rates of live discharge, not only 
pertaining to profit margins but also patient- and hospice-level characteristics. While causal 
estimates are not possible in this observational study, the statistically significant associations 
presented here reveal that hospice-level factors are in some way likely affecting rates of live 
discharge: If live discharges were determined completely based on patient needs and health 
status, we would expect to see no relationship between total/operating margins and live discharge 
rates when controlling for hospice and regional factors — which is not what we found here. 
Furthermore, if hospices were simply making live discharge decisions to stay afloat when facing 
financial challenges, then we would expect to see the opposite relationship, with lower profit 
margins associated with higher live discharge rates.  
Although we tested the hypothesis that profit margins affect live discharge rates, the 
relationship could plausibly go the other direction, in which high profit margins are simply an 
unintended consequence of a hospice organization’s internal policies and procedures resulting in 
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more live discharges. We estimated this association in the other direction, however, to align with 
the current evidence in the literature — and our conceptual model (see Appendix 1, Figure 5) — 
which indicated that hospice decision-making focused on profit maximization drives live 
discharges. Still, this relationship is virtually impossible to disentangle. 
The association between margins and live discharge rates does not on its own provide the 
strength of evidence for CMS to adopt live discharge rates as a quality indicator, however. Each 
individual live discharge from hospice occurs as a result of a number of interrelated factors, and 
it is possible that the associations presented here are truly the result of other hospice-level factors 
— that are not necessarily an indication of poor quality — beyond profit maximization. For 
example, a hospice organization with generous interpretations of hospice eligibility criteria could 
enroll greater numbers of patients who later stabilize and require live discharge. 
Additionally, hospices with higher rates of live discharge tended to have higher 
proportions of patients with minority races, on average This difference in enrollee composition 
between hospices with higher and lower live discharges could serve as a proxy for patient 
motivations/preferences, as the literature shows that, relative to White patients, minority groups 
have higher rates of patient-initiated hospice revocation (Chiriboga 2008, Johnson, Kuchibhatla 
et al. 2008, Hanchate, Kronman et al. 2009). In such instances, it is possible that larger profit 
margins are merely a byproduct of the patients enrolled and their higher propensity to live 
discharge rather than a provider-driven business decision. Furthermore, although live discharges 
may have a direct relationship with profit-maximizing strategies, there is also the possibility that 
they reflect a shift toward the use of hospice as a back-door long-term-care benefit, in which 
some hospices select longer stay, lower acuity patients, whose prognoses are difficult to predict 
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and whose live discharges are an unintended consequence of this shift — rather than an 
operational priority. 
 Still, these results should serve as a clarion call for broader benefit and payment reform. 
As the population continues to age and the number of individuals requiring end-of-life services 
and supports increases, the ability of the hospice industry to effectively deliver quality care to 
those vulnerable individuals is of paramount importance. The development of better patient- and 
family-centered definitions of “appropriate” live discharges versus those considered 
“inappropriate” will play a vital role in ensuring individuals at the end of life receive care 
consistent with their needs and preferences. 
Limitations 
 
Our study had several limitations. First, our financial measures are only as reliable as the 
cost report data from which they were generated. Indeed, federal regulators have expressed 
concern regarding the quality of these data. In September 2016, the Government Accountability 
Office noted the lack of reliability of skilled nursing facility cost reports due to the absence of 
routine auditing, a fact that extends to hospice cost reports (McCue and Thompson 2005, 2016). 
Still, cost reports are the only national dataset available with hospice financial performance 
information. We attempted to minimize these issues by trimming extreme outliers that appeared 
unusual, and plausibly inaccurate as a result, based on the size of the margin. Additionally, due 
to limited instructions in hospice form CMS-1984-99 (used for 2011-13 cost reports), we 
calculated a “best guess” for non-operating revenue and expenses (see Appendix 4, Exhibit 1, for 
more details). Thus, our total margin variable may not be as reliable as our operating margin 
variable.  
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Second, due to data use limitations, we suppressed hospices with fewer than 10 total 
discharges. As a result of this approach, we were concerned with left-censoring of our data, so 
we conducted a sensitivity analysis, restricting our model to hospices with 100 total discharges 
or more, which produced similar results. A related implication, we were unable to include 
covariates for certain demographics, such as proportion Black or Hispanic, because the 
populations in many hospices were so small that the values were suppressed, resulting in many 
missing values for these variables. Still, our inclusion of a proportion White variable ought to 
account for differences in both the proportion of White and non-White populations enrolled at a 
given hospice. 
Third, due to the washout period we implemented, enrollees with extremely long lengths 
of stay were eliminated from the file. While it is theoretically possible that these individuals were 
disproportionately enrolled in facilities with lower margins, therein altering the relationship 
between facility margins and live discharge rates, it is extremely unlikely. The fact that longer 
lengths of stay are more lucrative to hospices indicates that our live discharge rate is likely 
conservative, and the strength of the relationship between margins and live discharges may be 
even greater than what we have presented here. 
Fourth, given the limited number of time periods (T=2) and within-hospice variation, this 
study was cross-sectional in nature. Thus, we can only draw conclusions about a snapshot in 
time, rather than broad trends across a longer period. 
Finally, live discharges as an outcome can be viewed in the context of competing risk, in 
which beneficiaries face a hazard of being discharged alive, dying (discharged dead), or 
remaining enrolled in hospice on a daily basis. It is possible that this alternative — and more 
complicated — approach might yield different results from the one modeled here, though there is 
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no evidence to indicate that one approach is more reflective of the “true” hospice experience for 
enrollees compared to the other. 
Conclusion 
 
The results from this study point to a positive association between hospice margin and 
hospice-level live discharge rates, and, as such, further research is needed to provide additional 
evidence linking hospice business practices with rates of live discharge. Future studies could 
expand on this work to include longer panels of individual-level data aimed at understanding 
potential profit motivations over time and how margins change as the rate of live discharge 
increases or vice versa. Such an individual-level analysis could also more closely control for 
changes in patient diagnoses/acuity and explore longer term effects on live discharge patterns. 
Furthermore, clarifying the relationship between margins and live discharge rates in light of 
hospice ownership changes (e.g., corporate buy-outs, changes in hospice profit status from non-
profit to for-profit, etc.) could shed additional light on decision-making at the hospice level 
around admissions and discharges, potentially teasing out differences between non-
profit/government-owned hospices and for-profit hospices. In particular, researchers ought to 
explore the relationship between the aggregate cap, profit maximization, and live discharges, as 
the cap has been shown to be associated with higher rates of live discharge (Plotzke, Christian et 
al. 2015, Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014).  
More broadly, the industry could benefit from future work aimed at estimating an 
expected range of hospice-level live discharge rates, given that the rate should not be zero and 
could vary based on patient population characteristics. Such insights could eventually inform 
development of a live discharge quality measure and help CMS more effectively detect hospices 
that may be operating in a manner with insufficient regard for patient preferences and needs. 
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Furthermore, research testing alternative models of hospice delivery for patients with uncertain 
prognosis — such as those with advanced dementia, frailty, or multiple comorbid conditions — 
may help to reduce live discharges based on clinical inability to define the last six months of life. 
Finally, the live discharge literature could be expanded to include additional qualitative studies 
that explore patient and family experiences of care related to live discharges to better understand 
the effect hospice decision-making — potentially pertaining to profit maximization — has on 
patient outcomes of care.
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CHAPTER FOUR: AIM 3 STUDY 
Do live discharge rates increase as hospices approach their Medicare aggregate 
payment caps? 
 
For the last decade-and-a-half, the rate of live discharge from the Medicare hospice 
program increased steadily, from a national rate of 13.2 percent in 2000 to 17.2 percent in 2014, 
reaching a high of 18.5 percent in 2012 (MedPAC March 2016, Plotzke, Christian et al. May 
2014). Live discharges are associated with increased rates of patient emergency department 
visits, intensive care days, and inpatient admissions post-hospice discharge relative to persons 
continuously enrolled in hospice (Taylor, Steinhauser et al. 2008, Carlson, Herrin et al. 2010, 
Unroe, Greiner et al. 2012). Thus, this outcome has become a source of federal scrutiny, as the 
factors driving this rise remain unclear (Taylor, Steinhauser et al. 2008, Carlson, Herrin et al. 
2010, Unroe, Greiner et al. 2012). Live discharges can be either patient- or provider-initiated, but 
the documented relationship between hospice- and market-level factors and rates of live 
discharge suggests that variations in patient preference alone are likely not the sole source of the 
rising rate (Carlson, Herrin et al. 2009, Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014, Plotzke, Christian et al. 2015, 
Teno, Bowman et al. 2015, Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014). 
Recent research shows that newer (Medicare certified in the last five years) or for-profit 
hospices that exceeded their aggregate reimbursement caps are more likely than other hospices to 
have high discharge rates (Aldridge, Schlesinger et al. 2014, Plotzke, Christian et al. May 2014). 
Like the rate of live discharge, the proportion of hospices exceeding their respective aggregate
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caps has been on the rise over the last 15 years. Congress implemented the aggregate cap as part 
of the Medicare hospice payment system in 1983 to safeguard hospice’s short-term terminal 
carebenefit and prevent beneficiaries from relying on the hospice program for indefinite periods 
of time (Aldridge, Schlesinger et al. 2014, May 2015). The cap is calculated as a flat amount 
($27,820.75 for the year that ended on October 31, 2016) times the number of Medicare 
enrollees served by a given hospice during a 12-month period (November 1 to October 31); 
hospices exceeding their respective caps during this time span face a repayment penalty (CMS 
August 2015). Because hospices are reimbursed on a per-diem basis, the aggregate cap 
essentially constrains the annual average length of stay at a given facility, restricting the average 
cumulative per-patient reimbursement during a 12-month period (MedPAC March 2015, May 
2015). 
This risk of repayment to CMS and the manner in which the cap is calculated may 
incentivize hospices coming close to their respective cap ceilings to either admit more patients 
near the end of the cap year or discharge existing patients, especially longer stay patients who 
have been in hospice since the beginning of the cap year. Admitting more patients — particularly 
those most likely to have a shorter stay — would increase an individual hospice’s total cap dollar 
amount since the cap is calculated per-capita, while discharging patients alive would keep the 
average LOS from rising, therein reducing expenditures that contribute to the cap. Although 
limited, prior evidence in the literature suggests that some hospices may employ the latter 
method of discharging patients (Dolin, Hanson et al.). In particular, hospices that exceeded their 
aggregate cap had an average live discharge rate of 38.8 percent in 2012, compared to 17.4 
percent among hospices below the cap (Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). This difference is particularly 
stark at the upper and lower ends of cap attainment, with hospices experiencing an average 
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discharge rate of 12.5 percent when 0-20 percent of their cap had been attained, whereas, when 
hospices reached 150-plus percent of their annual cap, their average rate of live discharge was 
72.4 percent (Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). In its 2015 annual hospice payment system report, the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) expressed concern over this relationship, 
encouraging the Office of the Inspector General and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS) to review admission practices for hospices in excess of their aggregate caps, as 
this practice may indicate such hospices are admitting patients ineligible for the program 
(MedPAC March 2015).  
A more recent government report expanded upon this knowledge to ascertain the 
relationship between the percentage of cap attainment and monthly rates of live discharge for 
hospices above and below their caps (this latter group incorporated facilities nearly exceeding 
their caps), using a 10 percent random sample of beneficiaries in 2012-14 (Plotzke, Christian et 
al. 2015). The study estimated that the rate of live discharge for above- and below-cap groups 
increased in the later part of the cap year (July through October), providing some evidence that 
the cap year may influence the timing of live discharges.  
The objective of this study was to more closely model hospice live discharge decision-
making pertaining to cap status. Rather than employing a retrospective measure — percentage of 
cap attainment at the end of the cap year — we used the hospice-level monthly average LOS as a 
proxy for cap risk, as suggested by an industry workbook for hospice management (2010). We 
modeled the relationship between a hospice’s monthly risk of exceeding the cap and a given 
patient’s discharge status as one of competing risk, in which each patient faced a “hazard” of 
being discharged alive, dying, or remaining continuously enrolled each month. We hypothesized 
that as a hospice comes closer to exceeding its aggregate cap as the cap year progresses, a 
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patient’s likelihood of being discharged alive will increase, relative to dying or remaining 
continuously enrolled in hospice.  
Ultimately, this study seeks to build the evidence base around the relationship between 
the aggregate cap and live discharge rates and further explore the possibility that this 
longstanding mechanism of the Medicare hospice payment system may be inadvertently 
encouraging live discharges. 
Study data and methods 
Conceptual model 
 
We adapted Donabedian’s structure-process-outcome framework for this study (see 
Appendix 1, Figure 5), drilling down on the constellation of system/market factors that might 
influence patient care processes and which may ultimately affect the outcome of interest: live 
discharges from hospice (Donabedian 1966). We specifically focused our work on the hospice 
financial factor — risk of exceeding the cap — and its relationship with live discharges, 
controlling for a number of the structural elements in the diagram through our adjusted analyses. 
Data 
 
Data for this study came from 2012-2013 100 percent Medicare claims (Provider of 
Services file, the Hospice Research Identifiable File, and the Master Beneficiary Summary File). 
We merged the datasets to create a beneficiary-month analytic file for the years 2012-13. 
Beneficiaries with more than one death date (n=894), duplicate claim from (first day of the 
claim) and thru (last day of the claim) dates (n=26), overlapping stays in hospice (n=544), and 
claim utilization day count of 0 (n=19,755) were dropped from the claims file. For patients with 
a discharge code of 30 — “still a patient” — we stitched together their claims if they had a gap 
between stays of one day, under the assumption that the status code was reliable and a billing 
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error resulted in the gap between claims. Beneficiaries with stays ending in a discharge code of 
00 were also subsequently deleted from the file (n=584) because this discharge status is a data 
error. We deleted two facilities (n=1690 beneficiaries) from the file that appeared to be 
miscoding claims, which yielded a disproportionate share of beneficiaries coded as “transferring” 
hospices, when these patients appeared to remain continuously enrolled in that hospice. 
We created two separate analytic files to test the sensitivity of our analyses — one that 
incorporated a washout period of the first 90 days of 2012 (used as a sensitivity analysis) and one 
without a washout period. The purpose of the washout period was to ensure that the beneficiaries 
in the file represented those experiencing a new stay as of April 1, 2012, which allowed us to 
better track prior use of hospice, as many beneficiaries in the raw claims had missing hospice 
start dates. Although it is possible these individuals had a previous stay in hospice, the washout 
period limited prior stays to only those that are non-continuous, as beneficiaries enrolled in 
hospice between January and March 2012 were deleted from the file. Because the washout 
period inherently eliminated beneficiaries with extremely long LOS — likely yielding 
particularly conservative estimates, as long-stay beneficiaries experience live discharges at 
greater rates than shorter stay patients — analyses conducted with this file allowed us to test the 
sensitivity of our main results (Johnson, Elbert-Avila et al. 2012, Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). 
Key variables 
 
The key outcome was constructed using the patient discharge status code, with the patient 
experiencing one of three outcomes each month — discharged alive, discharged dead, or still a 
patient. Secondarily, we created an outcome variable with four options each month, where 
discharged alive was broken into two sub-groups: beneficiary revocation and provider-initiated 
live discharge. We excluded beneficiaries who moved out of the hospice’s service area from the 
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provider-initiated discharge totals, as this outcome is outside the control of the provider; still, 
these beneficiaries were retained in the analysis file, since they could theoretically enroll in 
another hospice and experience a live discharge for another reason at a later date.  
The main explanatory variable was a hospice’s monthly risk of exceeding the aggregate 
cap, approximated through the hospice-level monthly median LOS, aggregated with each 
successive month in the cap year (i.e., beginning November 2012) and calculated using the claim 
utilization day count variable in the Medicare claims. We excluded beneficiaries whose month 
on the first day of the claim (claim from date) was not the same as the month on the last day of 
the claim (claim thru date) from the monthly LOS calculations (n=9,982); we retained these 
beneficiaries in the analysis file, however. Though not calculated as a true “risk,” this approach 
serves as a proxy for the way in which a given hospice might consider the aggregate cap 
throughout the year. To test the sensitivity of our results, we also calculated the risk at the 
monthly mean hospice-level LOS, a measure more influenced by extreme outlier stays at a given 
hospice.  
Analysis 
 
Using a difference-in-difference-type analysis that leveraged within-hospice variation 
over time and between-hospice variation during a given month, we estimated discrete time 
hazard multinomial logit models. The models corrected the standard errors for clustering at the 
beneficiary level to account for shared unobserved risk factors. In this model, the “hazard” refers 
to the probability that a live discharge will occur for a particular individual during a given 
month, relative to the other two or three possible outcomes. We modeled this relationship using a 
variable with three choices (i.e., discharged dead, discharged alive, and still a patient) and, 
secondarily, with an outcome encompassing four choices (i.e., discharged dead, beneficiary 
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revocation, provider-initiated live discharge, and still a patient). For each outcome variable, we 
also modeled the relationship twice using the cap risk calculated as the monthly median LOS and 
— as a sensitivity analysis — as the mean LOS in the cap year to date. For all coefficients, we 
calculated average marginal effects.  
We adjusted models for a number of beneficiary-level covariates: age, race, primary 
diagnosis (based on the beneficiary’s first claim and grouped using the Clinical Classification 
software categories for diagnosis codes), and Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) group 
(collapsed into four groups: urban, large rural, small rural, and isolated). We also adjusted for 
facility-level characteristics: profit status, type (i.e., freestanding, hospital-based, home health-
based, and skilled nursing facility-based), chain status, rural status, census division, size, and 
market competition (based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)). Models also included an 
interaction effect between hospice rural location and census division to further account for 
geographic differences. 
Study results 
 
Our sample included a total of 2,026,456 discharged beneficiaries in 2012-13, 273,665 of 
whom were discharged alive for a rate of 13.5 percent across those two years. According to our 
analyses, 145,475 beneficiaries revoked hospice and the remaining 116,963 experienced some 
type of provider-initiated live discharge.  
Descriptive statistics (using the dataset without a washout period) are presented in Table 
5 by patient discharge status, either alive or dead. Across all variables, these outcomes (i.e., 
discharged dead and discharged alive) were statistically different (p<0.05). In total, hospice 
enrollees in 2012 and 2013 were most likely to be female, White, have a non-cancer diagnosis, 
and live in urban areas. These enrollees were also most likely to be served by non-profit, 
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freestanding, non-chain, large (average daily census of between 100 and 500 patients), and urban 
hospices.  
Table 5. Descriptive statistics, 2012-13, distribution of hospice characteristics by patient 
monthly discharge status code 
  Died Live discharge Total 
n 1,752,791 273,665 2,026,456 
Mean beneficiary age 84 85 84 
Median facility years in operation 20.5 17.8 20.1 
Median facility HHI 0.008 0.007 0.008 
Median facility LOS (days), 25th percentile 19 22 19 
Median facility LOS (days), 50th percentile 27 30 27 
Median facility LOS (days), 75h percentile 35 44 36 
Mean facility LOS (days), 25th percentile 31 35 32 
Mean facility LOS (days), 50th percentile 43 49 44 
Mean facility LOS (days), 75h percentile 58 67 59 
Median beneficiary LOS (days), 25th percentile 3 7 4 
Median beneficiary LOS (days), 50th percentile 7 14 8 
Median beneficiary LOS (days), 75h percentile 15 22 16 
    Sex 
Male 42.3% 35.7% 41.4% 
Female 57.7% 64.3% 58.6% 
    Beneficiary Race Code 
White 88.8% 83.5% 88.1% 
Black 7.1% 10.9% 7.6% 
Other 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 
Asian 1.0% 1.3% 1.0% 
Hispanic 1.7% 2.8% 1.9% 
North American Native 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 
Unknown 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
    Primary diagnosis, collapsed 
Cancer 31.5% 15.9% 29.4% 
Dementia/Alzheimer's 16.2% 20.7% 16.8% 
Failure to thrive 4.6% 8.3% 5.1% 
Debility, non-specified 8.3% 16.6% 9.4% 
CVA/Stroke 5.8% 4.4% 5.6% 
CHF 8.0% 9.0% 8.1% 
ESRD 0.9% 0.5% 0.8% 
Pneumonia 3.2% 1.4% 3.0% 
Parkinson's 1.9% 2.5% 2.0% 
Liver disease 1.0% 0.7% 1.0% 
Heart disease 5.4% 7.4% 5.7% 
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  Died Live discharge Total 
Other 13.0% 12.7% 13.0% 
    RUCA group 
Isolated 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 
Small rural 3.4% 3.8% 3.4% 
Large rural 6.5% 6.9% 6.6% 
Urban 87.0% 84.7% 86.7% 
No matching zip 0.7% 2.0% 0.9% 
    Facility ownership type 
For-profit 41.8% 51.9% 43.2% 
Non-profit/Gov. 47.8% 39.1% 46.6% 
Other 10.4% 9.0% 10.2% 
    Type of Facility 
Freestanding 76.6% 79.1% 76.9% 
HHA 13.5% 13.0% 13.4% 
Hospital 9.6% 7.6% 9.3% 
SNF 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
    Chain status 
Chain 45.6% 48.5% 45.9% 
Non-chain 54.4% 51.5% 54.1% 
    Hospice size 
X-large 12.3% 11.4% 12.2% 
Large 47.2% 42.3% 46.5% 
Medium 27.7% 30.3% 28.1% 
Small 11.1% 13.8% 11.5% 
X-small 1.6% 2.2% 1.7% 
    Rural/urban status 
Rural 12.0% 14.0% 12.2% 
Urban 88.0% 86.0% 87.8% 
    Census division 
New England 4.8% 4.4% 4.8% 
Middle Atlantic 11.7% 11.4% 11.6% 
East North Central 17.3% 13.0% 16.8% 
West North Central 7.6% 6.7% 7.5% 
South Atlantic 21.4% 23.0% 21.6% 
East South Central 6.1% 7.8% 6.3% 
West South Central 11.2% 11.7% 11.3% 
Mountain 7.1% 8.8% 7.3% 
Pacific 12.8% 13.3% 12.9% 
    All chi-square tests for comparisons between died and discharged alive were statistically significant. 
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Compared to enrollees discharged dead, those discharged alive were more likely to be 
female (64.3 percent v.  57.7 percent), non-White (16.5 percent v. 11.2 percent), have a non-
cancer diagnosis (84.1 percent vs. 68.5 percent), and live in a large rural areas (6.9 percent v. 6.5 
percent). In terms of facility characteristics, those discharged alive were more likely to be served 
by a for-profit (51.9 percent vs. 41.8 percent), freestanding (79.1 percent v. 76.6 percent), chain-
owned (48.5 percent vs. 45.6 percent), and medium (30.3 percent vs. 27.7 percent), small (13.8 
percent vs. 11.1 percent) or X-small (2.2 percent v. 1.6 percent) hospice, operating for fewer 
years, on average (17.8 years v. 20.5 years) and in slightly less competitive markets (0.007 v. 
0.008 HHI). Figure 3 provides an overview of these two outcomes — total discharged dead and 
discharged alive — by month during the 2013 cap year. 
Figure 3. Enrollee deaths and live discharges, by month 
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In terms of the explanatory variables of interest, beneficiaries discharged dead were 
served by facilities with shorter average LOS — facility-level median and mean LOS at the 25th, 
50th, and 75th percentiles — compared to those discharged alive. Similarly, at the beneficiary 
level, average LOS at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles were consistently lower for those who 
died compared to those discharged alive. Figure 4 shows trends in the cap-risk variable 
(calculated as the monthly median facility-level LOS) across the cap year, which began 
November 1, 2012, and ended October 31, 2013. As the figure shows, hospices’ risks of 
exceeding the cap inherently increases at the year progresses and then immediately decreases at 
the start of the new cap year; see Appendix 6, Figure 8, for a graphical depiction of hospice 
monthly cap risk at the mean. 
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Figure 4. Monthly facility-level cap risk, 2013 cap year24 
 
 
Adjusted analyses, presented in Table 6 and run on the main dataset without a 90-day 
washout period, show the average marginal effects of cap risk on the three-outcome discharge 
variable (i.e., discharged dead, discharged alive, and still a patient). As Table 6 shows, the 
coefficients on cap risk were statistically significant (p<0.05). The marginal effect of died was 
negatively associated with cap risk, while live discharge and “still a patient” were positively 
associated with cap risk. In other words, as a hospice’s cap-risk increased, a given beneficiary’s 
likelihood of being discharged alive, relative to dying or remaining a patient, increased during 
the cap year, holding all else constant. Notably, the magnitude of the positive association 
between cap risk and the average marginal effect of “still a patient” was greater than between 
                                                
24Facility-level cap risk was calculated as the median LOS, aggregated with each successive month in the cap year. 
(i.e., beginning November 2012). 
  93 
cap risk and live discharge. Sensitivity analyses conducted using monthly cap risk at the mean, 
rather than the median, produced similar results (see Appendix 6, Table 10). 
Table 6. Marginal effects on cap risk, multinomial logit model 
  Average marginal effect 
p-value on 
coefficient 
Died -0.0031888 0.000 
Live discharge 0.0001196 0.000 
Still a patient 0.0030692 Base outcome 
n 4,217,734 
All models were clustered at the beneficiary level and controlled for: beneficiary age, beneficiary sex, beneficiary 
primary diagnosis, beneficiary RUCA group, facility type, facility profit status, facility years in operation, facility 
census division, facility rural/urban status, facility size, HHI, month in the cap year, and an interaction between 
facility census division and rural/urban status. 
 
Analyses on the four-outcome variable (i.e., discharged dead, patient revocation, 
provider-initiated live discharge, and still a patient) showed a negative average marginal effect 
for provider-initiated live discharge and a positive average marginal effect for patient revocation, 
holding all else constant (see Appendix 6, Table 11). The sensitivity analysis, using cap-risk at 
the mean, revealed similar associations (see Appendix 6, Table 12). Adjusted analyses run on the 
dataset with a washout period appeared comparable with results produced from the non-washout 
dataset and are not presented here.  
Discussion 
 
 Results from this study show a positive and statistically significant relationship between a 
hospice’s risk of exceeding its respective aggregate cap and the likelihood that an enrolled 
patient will experience a live discharge (relative to dying or remaining continuously enrolled). 
These findings build on the evidence in the literature pointing to a relationship between hospice 
aggregate cap attainment and rates of live discharge, providing a more nuanced picture of the 
monthly trends in live discharge patterns and corroborating the concern MedPAC expressed in 
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its 2015 Report to Congress that suggested the aggregate cap may be encouraging live 
discharges.  
 While the average marginal effect of cap risk on live discharges was positive and 
statistically significant across models, the effect size was small — nearly zero — possibly 
indicating the absence of a true effect. More likely, though, this small effect size reflects the fact 
that the analytic file incorporated all hospices, and the facilities motivated to live discharge 
patients in response to the cap represent a small proportion of all providers. In 2014, only 10.6 
percent of all hospices exceeded their respective aggregate caps (Plotzke, Christian et al. 2015). 
Therefore, the large proportion of hospices not influenced by the cap may be masking the true —
and likely much larger — effect size for the segment of hospices discharging patients in response 
to the cap ceiling. 
Similarly, the fact that the magnitude of the average marginal effect of cap risk on patient 
revocation was positive and the average marginal effect on provider-initiated live discharge was 
negative raises questions (see Appendix 6, Table 11). Theoretically, if providers make live 
discharge decisions based, at least in part, on their risk of exceeding the aggregate cap, we would 
expect these decisions to affect only the likelihood that a patient experiences a provider-initiated 
live discharge — not the likelihood that a patient revokes the benefit. Thus, this finding may 
indicate that the coding differentiating between patient revocation and provider-initiated live 
discharges in the Medicare claims is unreliable. This relationship between cap risk and 
revocation may also suggest that another phenomenon unaccounted for in the models presented 
in this study is driving this association or that, perhaps, more ominously, hospices are in some 
instances encouraging patients to revoke their hospice benefit as the year progresses to avoid 
reaching their cap and facing a Medicare repayment penalty 
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 Furthermore, the fact that adjusted analyses were statistically significant across models 
when using the dataset with a washout period, which eliminated some of the patients potentially 
most likely to experience a live discharge, suggests that the relationship between the cap and live 
discharges affects all hospice enrollees — not just longer stay patients with a plausibly more 
ambiguous prognosis (Johnson, Elbert-Avila et al. 2012, Teno, Plotzke et al. 2014). 
 Although Medicare initially implemented the aggregate cap as a way to ensure hospice 
remained an end-of-life benefit (i.e., to provide disincentives for initiating hospice services too 
early), these results suggest that policymakers ought to seriously consider the unintended 
consequences this longstanding aspect of the payment system may now be having on patient 
outcomes of care. Other than increasing the cap amount on an annual basis and aligning the cap 
year with the federal fiscal year (FY) starting in FY 2017, CMS has not directly implemented 
major reforms of the aggregate cap since the cap’s implementation with the larger Medicare 
hospice program in 1983. The cap may be a microcosm of the broader challenges a 30-plus-year-
old payment system is facing in the context of an industry that has experienced significant 
changes, particularly over the last decade-and-a-half, with expenditures inflating from $2.9 
billion in 2000 to $15.1 billion in 2012, the number of hospice providers increasing by 65 
percent during that time, and average LOS swelling from an average of between 55 and 75 days 
in the early years of the hospice program to 88 days in 2014 (MedPAC March 2016, May 2015). 
With all these changes, the aggregate cap has become more visible with an increasing number of 
hospices either exceeding (9.8 percent in 2011, 11.0 percent in 2012, 10.7 percent in 2013, and 
10.6 percent in 2014) or nearly exceeding the cap (Plotzke, Christian et al. 2015, MedPAC 
March 2016). And federal policymakers ought to continue to monitor its place in the hospice 
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payment system in an environment in which the proportion of longer stay non-cancer hospice 
enrollees continues to grow. 
 The recent FY 2016 Hospice Wage Index and Payment Rate Update — which 
implemented a u-shaped payment curve through which providers are reimbursed a higher rate at 
the beginning and end of the hospices stay — may ultimately have implications for the 
relationship between the cap and live discharges, possibly reducing the incentive for enrolling 
patients for particularly long stays. Given the associations between cap risk and live discharges 
presented here in the context of the pre-reform payment system, policymakers and researchers 
will need to continue to monitor this trend to determine whether such relationships persist — or, 
perhaps, new mechanisms for cap-based “gaming” have formed. 
Limitations 
 
This study had several limitations. First, though our key exploratory variable was meant 
to represent a “risk” of exceeding the aggregate cap, it was not calculated as a true risk. Although 
we opted for an approach that attempted to model this “risk” from the individual hospice 
perspective, it is impossible to know if this approach accurately captures the way the majority of 
hospices conceptualize and respond to changes in their respective cap status.  Furthermore, it is 
likely that hospices vary in their approach to monitoring the cap, which is impossible to capture 
with a single measure. Still, an industry document discussing ways for hospices to manage the 
cap suggests our approach may be a reasonable proxy (2010). 
Second, the analysis run for this study relies on beneficiary-month observations and 
therefore does not account for the possibility that individuals are discharged and readmitted 
within the month timespan. In effect, all days enrolled in hospice during a month are treated as a 
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single stay for the purposes of determining beneficiaries’ outcomes and calculating monthly 
hospice-level cap risk. 
Third, we calculated the cap risk variables using the claim utilization day count variable 
in the Medicare claims, which is based on the number of days for which the provider would like 
to be reimbursed by Medicare, rather than the number of actual days for which Medicare 
reimburses. We used this variable rather than calculating the number of days each beneficiary 
was enrolled in hospice because the cap-focused analysis was concerned with Medicare-paid 
days only. Furthermore, due to data use agreement restrictions, we suppressed median and mean 
LOS less than 10, which may have overstated facility-level LOS calculations. 
Finally, this study only included data from a single cap year (i.e., from November 2012 to 
October 2013), which limited our ability to explore cap trends related to discharge rates across 
time. Without the context of additional years of data, it is impossible to know whether the 2013 
cap year reflected broader trends or whether it was an aberration. 
Conclusion 
 
Although the results from this study show a positive association between hospice cap risk 
and the likelihood of live discharge, a number of questions remain about the relationship 
between the aggregate cap and live discharges. In particular, because this work uses data from 
2012 and 2013, the effect of FY 2016 Hospice Wage Index and Payment Rate Update is not 
incorporated in this analysis. It is possible that the trends documented here could be different in 
this new payment environment. As such, future research ought to explore this question regarding 
the relationship between hospice cap risk and live discharges using data from 2016 and later to 
determine how, if at all, the payment reform has mediated the relationship between these two 
factors. Furthermore, future research could more fully explore different ways of measuring “risk” 
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with regard to the aggregate cap to possibly capture the implications of this phenomenon. As part 
of this exploration, researchers could also explore the possibility that hospices are admitting — 
rather than discharging — patients in response to concerns about their respective cap ceilings. In 
particular, qualitative research could lend insight into the different ways hospices operationally 
consider the aggregate cap. Finally, further work is needed to explore the relationship between 
patient revocation and cap risk.
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMPLICATIONS 
 
What factors drive live discharge from hospice? 
 
The three studies presented here together sought to answer the overarching question, 
“What factors drive live discharge from hospice?” Although synthesis of prior literature 
responded to some aspects of this inquiry, many pieces remained unanswered, particularly 
regarding the factors that have propelled the rate steadily upward over the last decade and 
contributed to significant geographic variations nationwide. To answer this question, we 
conducted three related studies; Table 7 provides an overview of each. 
Table 7. Overview of three study objectives and results 
Study 1 (Chapter 2): Qualitatively explored provider perspectives regarding the factors driving live 
discharge from hospice. Providers described four key themes contributing to the rising national rate of 
live discharge in the last decade-and-a-half: 1) difficulty estimating patient prognosis, particularly 
among non-cancer patients; 2) increased CMS oversight that has created a culture of fear and 
encouraged live discharges as a result; 3) rising market competition resulting in admission of 
inappropriate long-stay patients and aggressive marketing practices; and 4) difficulties contracting 
with local inpatient facilities. Participants emphasized challenges underlying each decision to live 
discharge, stressing that there often exists a grey line between “appropriate” and “inappropriate” 
discharges. Discussions also focused on certain scenarios in which financial motivations drive 
enrollment and disenrollment practices. Results suggested that live discharge patterns are often 
susceptible to market and regulatory forces, which may have contributed to the rising national rate. 
Study 2 (Chapter 3): Empirically estimated the relationship between hospice margins (total and 
operating) and facility-level live discharge rates. Adjusted analyses showed a positive and statistically 
significant association between operating and total margin and hospice-level rates of live discharge. 
The finding that hospices with higher rates of live discharges have higher financial margins supported 
concerns other investigators raised regarding live discharges occurring for financially motivated — 
rather than patient-based — factors and contributes to the discussion of Medicare hospice payment 
reform.  
Study 3 (Chapter 4): Quantitatively investigated monthly trends in live discharge patterns to 
determine if hospices were more likely to discharge patients as they got closer to exceeding their 
respective aggregate caps during a 12-month period. Adjusted analyses showed a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between cap risk and live discharges. Results suggested 
policymakers ought to consider the unintended consequences the aggregate cap may be having on 
patient outcomes of care. 
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Overall, the results from these three studies together paint a complicated picture in which 
live discharges stem from not one primary driver but the confluence of many, arrayed in a 
variety of ways, to produce each individual patient-level outcome. Each live discharge reflects a 
complex assortment of interpersonal, intrapersonal, organizational, and environmental factors 
that ultimately result in the decision to live discharge — either by the patient and his/her family 
or by the provider. As such, it is impossible for researchers to accurately characterize the nature 
of each individual discharge, as the precise reasons propelling such outcomes frequently lay 
outside of the Medicare claims or the data collected through qualitative work. 
Still, these three studies fill in significant gaps in the literature and aid our understanding 
of the overarching trends in the industry with regard to admission and live discharge practices. 
While previous literature clearly documented the relationship between particular patient- and 
provider-level factors associated with higher rates of live discharge — speculating that such 
patterns stemmed from factors beyond differences in patient preferences and prognoses/health 
statuses — this study took the evidence a step further. To our knowledge, these are the first 
studies that explore 1) the relationship between CMS pre- and post-payment auditing/review 
practices and rates of live discharge; 2) challenges hospices have experienced contracting with 
local area inpatient facilities that, in essence, force live discharges for patients in need of 
inpatient services; 3) the role of market saturation and competition on live discharge patterns; 
and 4) the association between hospice profit margins (total and operating) and facility-level live 
discharge rates. Furthermore, we provide evidence to reinforce concerns that the aggregate cap 
may be inadvertently encouraging higher rates of live discharge on an annual basis. All such 
contributions to the literature suggest that the hospice delivery system does not always work as it 
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should — that there are factors that might be encouraging patient live discharges beyond changes 
in patient preferences and prognoses/health statuses.  
Live discharge rates: A quality indicator? 
 
Although these three studies together provide evidence for “gaming” in the hospice 
delivery system, such trends do not suggest that higher live discharge rates are automatically 
reflective of poor quality — and vice versa.  Indeed, it would be easy to take the findings from 
this work and point to them as evidence for the implementation of a national claims-based 
quality indicator, in which hospices with high rates of live discharge are considered low-quality 
providers, and hospices with low rates of live discharge are considered high-quality providers. In 
some instances, this black-and-white interpretation may be accurate. But in others, it may be 
lacking in nuance at best — downright inaccurate at worst. 
Certainly, these studies reinforce the evidence that many live discharges, particularly in 
recent years, have occurred for financially motivated reasons. But as a number of the providers 
interviewed for the qualitative portion of this work pointed out, provider-initiated live discharges 
also often occur for reasons that are, in fact, beyond the control of the provider. For patients 
experiencing a live discharge because their hospice was previously unable to contract with a 
local inpatient facility or because that patient is declining so rapidly that the prospect of SNF 
room and board is preferable to intermittent hospice services at home (see Chapter 2 for more 
information), it is the hospice system that has failed the patient — not the hospice itself. 
Likewise, when patients who would otherwise benefit from continued hospice care experience a 
live discharge because their prognosis may raise red flags with CMS auditors, in many instances, 
the system has failed the patient. Furthermore, the fact that the hospice program relies on the 
judgment of a provider to accurately forecast patient prognoses and applies a rigid system of 
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oversight to second-guess those judgments presents a paradox of sorts for providers. When 
patients experience a live discharge as a result of this dichotomy, again, that patient is oftentimes 
a victim of the system’s failings rather than the provider’s. 
The introduction of a claims-based quality indicator that does not account for these 
factors is no quality indicator at all. Based on the evidence presented here, CMS ought to explore 
this measure in greater depth before proceeding with the adoption of a live discharge-based 
quality metric. As conversations with providers about the implications of CMS auditing around 
the country emphasized, the potential for unintended consequences is always high when altering 
federal rules and oversight practices. In particular, additional research attempting to model the 
“expected” range of live discharges for a given hospice based on distinct patient characteristics 
may assist CMS in the development of a more accurate measure that reflects the complicated 
reality surrounding live discharges and the decision-making processes that lead to them.  
Hospice payment system: Time for widespread reforms? 
 
Such discussions about financially motivated live discharges and failings of the hospice 
system that result in a live discharge automatically raise larger questions about the adequacy of 
the hospice payment system. Although momentous in the context of a payment system that 
remained virtually unchanged for 30 years, the newly implemented FY 2016 Hospice Wage 
Index and Payment Rate Update likely did not go far enough in discouraging patient selection 
and encouraging high-quality care. Although the u-shaped curve, suggested by MedPAC in 
2009, may discourage some particularly long stays, as this payment change more appropriately 
reimburses hospices for the most expensive portions of stays, there are still larger issues in the 
payment system. As this work pointed out, the aggregate cap may be encouraging live discharges 
(see Chapter 4 for more information) — and its reform, though considered, was omitted entirely 
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from the FY 2016 Hospice Wage Index and Payment Rate Update Final Rule. Furthermore, the 
per diem-based payment system will likely continue to encourage the cherry-picking of certain 
lower cost, longer stay patients, who are discharged from hospice at higher rates. 
Instead of reforming the entire payment system, the solution may still lay in more 
targeted CMS oversight. But the experiences of providers presented in this study ought to serve 
as a cautionary tale for the effects that indiscriminate auditing can have on patient outcomes of 
care. The fact that providers admitted to discharging patients for fear of repercussions from CMS 
audits — in spite of the potential negative ramifications those discharges could have on patient 
lives —underscores a need for a revised approach to oversight. Such an approach ought to more 
effectively target the “bad actors” and allow seasoned, good-intentioned providers to continue to 
deliver high-quality care to patients in need of such end-of-life services and supports.  
The Medicare hospice program in the context of the larger delivery system 
 
Beyond the payment system, these studies raised questions about the structure of the 
Medicare hospice benefit in the context of a constantly changing health delivery system. 
Currents of change swept through the hospice industry during the last decade-and-a-half, 
increasing enrollment, and expanding the number of providers by 65 percent. With those changes 
emerged questions about whether the hospice benefit continues to meet the needs of the patient 
population it currently serves. Although this work does not provide concrete support for a change 
in the benefit structure, the qualitative study raised questions about the benefit design, 
particularly the sufficiency of the six-month prognostication criterion to meet the needs of an 
increasingly non-cancer patient population. Indeed, while the question was not answered through 
these studies, the fact that it was raised emphasizes the need for continued reevaluation of the 
benefit design. 
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As the U.S. population continues to age, the role of hospice in delivering end-of-life 
services and supports will become increasingly important. A related implication, these studies 
suggest that there exist a number of community-dwelling elderly individuals nearing the end of 
life who are marginally eligible for hospice and who are not being served elsewhere. The 
presence of such individuals across markets — available for hospice enrollment and subsequent 
disenrollment — underscores the virtual absence of a long-term-services-and-supports system as 
well as the limited availability of home- and community-based services. While increasing 
lengths of stay suggest that many of these patients are inappropriately enrolled in hospice, at the 
individual patient level, their receipt of palliative and hospice services may not always be a bad 
thing.  
Political realities aside, policymakers ought to continue having serious conversations 
about the mission of hospice and its place in the larger health care delivery system. At a 
minimum, the totality of this work suggests that the Medicare hospice program has serious issues 
that must be resolved through payment system reform, increased oversight, benefit redesign, or 
some combination thereof. In 1992, when just 197,400 beneficiaries enrolled in hospice, it was 
easy to dismiss the benefit as a small and insignificant portion of the larger health system pie. 
But today, with 1.3 million beneficiaries, 4,000 providers, and spending equaling $15.1 billion, 
hospice can no longer be viewed as the stepchild of the Medicare program. It is — and will 
continue to be — a vital source of care for some of our nation’s most vulnerable patients.  
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APPENDIX 1: CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
Figure 5. Conceptual model 
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APPENDIX 2: AIM 2 STUDY COST REPORT FISCAL YEAR ASSIGNMENT 
 
Figure 6. Fiscal year assignment, 2012 and 2013 cost report data25 
 
 
Figure 7. Fiscal year assignment, 2011 and 2012 cost report data24 
 
                                                
25Figure does not include all hospice observations from the Cost Report files. Only the most common fiscal years 
are included here. 
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APPENDIX 3: AIM 2 STUDY SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
Table 8. Sensitivity analyses, Total margins 
  Live discharge rate 
  Total discharges >=100,  state clusters 
With failure to thrive & 
debility, state clusters 
  (1) (2) 
   Hospice total margins 0.0351** 0.00915 
 (0.009) (0.539) 
   Log total discharges -0.0245*** -0.0210*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   Proportion of White patients -0.0787** -0.0647* 
 (0.002) (0.015) 
   Proportion of female patients 0.0372 -0.0741 
 (0.318) (0.108) 
   Hospice mean age -0.00210 -0.00654*** 
 (0.110) (0.001) 
   Hospice years in operation -0.00122** -0.00196** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
   Northeast 0.0114* 0.0248*** 
 (0.023) (0.000) 
   South 0.00641 0.00503 
 (0.454) (0.574) 
   West 0.0113 0.00384 
 (0.284) (0.561) 
   Rural 0.00371 0.0106 
 (0.446) (0.266) 
   Non-profit/Gov. -0.00757 -0.00539 
 (0.127) (0.422) 
   Other -0.0111* -0.0156** 
 (0.018) (0.006) 
   Chain -0.00366 -0.00657 
 (0.374) (0.225) 
   Analysis year, 2013 0.0307*** 0.0447*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
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Percentage failure to thrive  0.00163** 
  (0.002) 
   Percentage debility, non-specified  0.000939** 
  (0.001) 
   Constant 0.454*** 0.843*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
n 1821 662 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 9. Sensitivity analyses, Operating margins 
  Live discharge rate 
  Total discharges >=100,  state clusters 
With failure to thrive & 
debility, state clusters 
  (1) (2) 
   Hospice operating margins 0.0231** 0.0113 
 (0.003) (0.423) 
   Log total discharges -0.0247*** -0.0223*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   Proportion of White patients -0.0810** -0.0710* 
 (0.001) (0.013) 
   Proportion of female patients 0.0406 -0.0660 
 (0.283) (0.150) 
   Hospice mean age -0.00210 -0.00618** 
 (0.097) (0.002) 
   Hospice years in operation -0.00121** -0.00193** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   Northeast 0.0102* 0.0258*** 
 (0.048) (0.000) 
   South 0.00527 0.00481 
 (0.542) (0.602) 
   West 0.0109 0.00419 
 (0.284) (0.554) 
   Rural 0.00529 0.0116 
 (0.311) (0.232) 
   Non-profit/Gov. -0.00549 -0.00437 
 (0.264) (0.543) 
   Other -0.00998 -0.0123 
 (0.053) (0.068) 
   Chain -0.00373 -0.00752 
 (0.420) (0.238) 
   Analysis year, 2013 0.0306*** 0.0444*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   Percentage failure to thrive  0.00155** 
  (0.005) 
   Percentage debility, non-specified  0.000844** 
  110 
  (0.005) 
   Constant 0.458*** 0.824*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   n 1862 668 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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APPENDIX 4: AIM 2 STUDY MARGIN EQUATIONS 
 
Exhibit 1. Margin equations 
 
Operating and total margins variables were both calculated from information on hospice 
cost report form CMS-1984-99 from 2011-13, Worksheet G2, Parts I and II.  
 
More specifically, operating margin was calculated as: 
 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 = (Total general inpatient revenues − Operating expenses)Total general inpatient revenues  
 
And total margin was calculated as: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 = (Operating revenue + nonoperating revenue) − (Operating expenses + nonoperating expenses)(Operating revenue + nonoperating revenue)  
 
More specifically, using the cost reports, this was calculated as:  
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛= Total general inpatient Revenues + Total deductions +  State Medicaid room & board – (Operating expenses + Total additions)(State Medicaid room & board + Total general inpatient Revenues + Total deductions)  
 
 
Where the sum of total deductions and state Medicaid room & board equal non-operating 
revenue, and total additions equal non-operating expenses. These assumptions were made based 
on a thorough review of instructions for hospice cost report form CMS-1984-99, supplemented 
with the instructions for the newer form, CMS-1984-14, which provide more detailed 
information for cost report submissions made on or after Oct. 1, 2014. Due to these necessary 
assumptions, we are more confident in the reliability of the operating margin measure. 
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APPENDIX 5: AIM 2 STUDY ANALYTIC APPROACH 
 
Exhibit 2. Fixed effects vs. random effects 
In theory, fixed effects models are preferable in a panel dataset, controlling for time-
invariant characteristics that may bias the outcome variable. Hausman tests support the use of 
fixed effects over both pooled ordinary least squares and random effects in this dataset; however, 
we found the fixed effects estimates to be highly variable and inefficient, as shown in the table 
below. This is because fixed effects models are consistent as the number of time periods reaches 
infinity. With T=2 in this instance, standard errors in the fixed effects model increased 
dramatically relative to other models. Thus, we chose to use random effects with clustering at the 
state level because these models are less sensitive to the number of observations per unit and are 
ultimately more consistent. 
Fixed effects models 
  Live discharge rate 
  
(1) 
Total margins, Clustered, 
State-level 
(2) 
Operating margins, 
Clustered, State-level 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
     Hospice total margins 0.0174 0.627 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Hospice operating margins 
 
 -0.00323 0.900 
  
 
 
 
Log total discharges -0.0271 0.073 -0.0298* 0.050 
  
 
 
 
Proportion of White patients -0.153 0.125 -0.138 0.154 
  
 
 
 
Proportion of female patients -0.0640 0.390 -0.0563 0.437 
  
 
 
 
Hospice mean age -0.00127 0.720 -0.00194 0.605 
  
 
 
 
Hospice years in operation 0.0277** 0.002 0.0291** 0.001 
  
 
 
 
Non-profit/Gov. -0.0254*** 0.000 -0.0247*** 0.000 
  
 
 
 
Other -0.0261*** 0.000 -0.00351 0.331 
  
 
 
 
Constant 0.189 0.434 0.222 0.380 
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n 2133 2179 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Model run with region, rural, facility ownership type, chain status, and analysis year fixed effects. 
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APPENDIX 6: AIM 3 STUDY SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
Figure 8. Monthly facility-level cap risk (mean length of stay), 2013 cap year 
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Table 10. Sensitivity analysis, marginal effects on mean length of stay, multinomial logit 
model with three-outcome discharge status variable 
  Average marginal effect 
p-value on 
coefficient 
Died -0.0034521 0.000 
Live discharge 0.0000464 0.000 
Still a patient 0.0034057 Base outcome 
n 4,369,356 
 
All models were clustered at the beneficiary level and controlled for: beneficiary age, beneficiary sex, beneficiary 
primary diagnosis, beneficiary RUCA group, facility type, facility profit status, facility years in operation, facility 
census division, facility rural/urban status, facility size, HHI, month in the cap year, and an interaction between 
facility census division and rural/urban status. 
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Table 11. Marginal effects on median length of stay, multinomial logit model with four-
outcome discharge status variable 
  Average marginal effect 
p-value on 
coefficient 
Died -0.0031935 0.000 
Provider-initiated -0.00000332 0.000 
Patient revocation 0.0000889 0.000 
Still a patient 0.003108 Base outcome 
n 4,203,274 
All models were clustered at the beneficiary level and controlled for: beneficiary age, beneficiary sex, beneficiary 
primary diagnosis, beneficiary RUCA group, facility type, facility profit status, facility years in operation, facility 
census division, facility rural/urban status, facility size, HHI, month in the cap year, and an interaction between 
facility census division and rural/urban status. 
 
Table 12. Sensitivity analysis, marginal effects on mean length of stay, multinomial logit 
model with four-outcome discharge status variable 
  Average marginal effect 
p-value on 
coefficient 
Died -0.0034601 0.000 
Provider-initiated -0.0000417 0.000 
Patient revocation 0.0000621 0.040 
Still a patient 0.0034397 Base outcome 
n 4,354,425 
All models were clustered at the beneficiary level and controlled for: beneficiary age, beneficiary sex, beneficiary 
primary diagnosis, beneficiary RUCA group, facility type, facility profit status, facility years in operation, facility 
census division, facility rural/urban status, facility size, HHI, month in the cap year, and an interaction between 
facility census division and rural/urban status. 
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